En el Alamein Monty utilizó sabiamente la ocultación o deception en la que se denominó operación Bertram; que estaba dirigida a convencer a Rommel de que el ataque principal se realizaría por el sur y con un tempo diferente al real. Se utilizaron tanques de atrezzo así como un oleoducto ficticio, de forma que los alemanes creyeran que el ataque se dilataría aún en el tiempo. En el Norte se tomaron medidas de ocultación de los carros y otras armas pesadas. El general Stumme que reemplazó temporalmente a Rommel dividió sus fuerzas enviando al sur la XXI Panzer y Ariete y colocando la Trieste y la 90 Ligera en un punto intermedio algo por detrás para poder girar a norte o sur según las circunstancias.
"
fuente http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... ertram.jpg
Sin embargo, el plan de Monty se encontró con el insigne y genial Rommel y con la realidad de la batalla y las minas alemanas, el "campo del Diablo" que ocasionó desastrosas consecuencias a los ingleses hasta el punto de que varios de ellos sugirieron cancelar la operación. Rommel actuó con brillantez y luego perdió por la fuerza de la superioridad enemiga entre otras cosas:
[quote]Why did the British win at El Alamein ?
Deception did play a role, but there were other important factors that contributed to the victory.
The traditional, perhaps simplified, view contends that victory was due to Montgomery's inspired leadership and his unflinching battle strategy. There is some truth in this. Montgomery's unyielding doctrine of maximum concentration at a single point to smash the enemy eventually proved unstoppable.
However, the following contributions are also recognised as critical :
• the outstanding performance of Australians and New Zealanders.
• the newly arrived and technologically superior M4 Sherman Tanks provided by America. In contrast, the Germans failed to meet their original deadline of introducing the advanced Tiger tank.
• Rommel's absence in the first 48 hours of the battle.
• fuel and ammunition shortages.
Rommel had'stretched his elastic' to the maximum. As discussed in the previous article, an important reason why the North African campaigns oscillated so dramatically was the logistical predicament. Changes in length to the supply lines eventually handicapped the invader and favoured the defender. The further an army pushed forward in triumph, the less able it was to deliver the killer blow against the retreating enemy forces. Overstretched, it then became vulnerable to counter-attack.
• the waning of German air power.
By October 1942, German aerial reconnaissance had been severely curtailed. The German air force was outnumbered, overstretched and exhausted. Convoy protection was given high priority. The resumption of bombing raids against Malta also diverted scarce resources.
An embarrassing statistic confirming the weak state of the GAF is that on October 24th , the first main day of battle after the night-time offensive, the Germans only managed 107 sorties whereas the British achieved 1, 000.
The British also experimented with special jamming aircraft which disrupted radio contact between Panzer units.
• Ultra intelligence. Although Montgomery did not know the exact details of Rommel's defensive battle plan, he knew precisely Rommel's troop and tank strengths.
Recently released documents also confirm that Ultra enabled the British to track and sink vital ammunition and fuel supplies.
• Field Intelligence.
Montgomery's 'Y' service, which intercepted battlefield communications, was coming into prominence. In contrast, Rommel's own battlefield intelligence unit was now severely handicapped.
In Fisher's book there is no reference to July 10th, the day on which Australian troops stormed the Afrika Korps' forward intercept station.
Seebohm, commander of Rommel's SIGINT team had moved his unit to elevated ground to maximise the number of transmissions intercepted. The Australians eliminated this position in a surprise attack, capturing men and documents, and fatally wounding Seebohm. The hidden secret behind Rommel's Fingerspitzengefuhl (uncanny sixth sense) was at last revealed.
However, the decisive factor influencing victory at El Alamein was surely the incontrovertible fact that Montgomery had more men and military hardware.
On the eve of the battle, the British were well aware of this superiority . An enigma decrypt from October 20th revealed German troops numbered only 49,000 and Italian troops were 54,000, compared to the British Army's 195,000.
Another enigma decrypt, intercepted on October 23rd, gave precise details of tank strengths:
German : 238 tanks (including 30 obsolete Pzkw II's). Italians : 279 tanks
British : 1,029 tanks (plus 200 in reserve), plus a further 1,000 under repair or being altered.
With hard-headed statistics like these, the unglamorous theory of warfare dubbed 'brute force' seems the most relevant in any discussion of why Montgomery won at El Alamein.
John Ellis argues that "the outcome was never in much doubt, because of the tremendous material superiority which the Commonwealth forces were able to bring to bear..." [/quote]
http://www.maskelynemagic.com/12alamein1.html
On the eve of battle, transport vehicles (in actuality, tanks) would assemble in the north ; armoured vehicles and tanks ( in actuality, dummies) would gather to the south.
Stockpiles of fuel for the main army to the north would have to be assembled and hidden in advance. Conversely, a fake dump to the south would have to be created.
To meet these challenges, the camouflage experts came up with strong practical solutions.
The petrol for the main thrust was secretly loaded into old slit-trenches to the north.
A fake water pipeline, snaking south, code named 'Diamond', was constructed from flattened fuel cans. It was hoped that German reconnaissance planes studying the pipeline's daily progress would calculate that it could not possibly be operational until November.
"
The object of the deception plan was twofold:
(a) To conceal from the enemy as long as possible our intention to take the offensive.
(b) When this could no longer be concealed, to mislead him about the date and the sector in which our main thrust was to be made.
This was done by the concealment of real intentions and real moves in the north, and by advertising false signs of activity in the south."
Montgomery's own memoirs (p. 121)[/quote
fuente http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... ertram.jpg
Sin embargo, el plan de Monty se encontró con el insigne y genial Rommel y con la realidad de la batalla y las minas alemanas, el "campo del Diablo" que ocasionó desastrosas consecuencias a los ingleses hasta el punto de que varios de ellos sugirieron cancelar la operación. Rommel actuó con brillantez y luego perdió por la fuerza de la superioridad enemiga entre otras cosas:
[quote]Why did the British win at El Alamein ?
Deception did play a role, but there were other important factors that contributed to the victory.
The traditional, perhaps simplified, view contends that victory was due to Montgomery's inspired leadership and his unflinching battle strategy. There is some truth in this. Montgomery's unyielding doctrine of maximum concentration at a single point to smash the enemy eventually proved unstoppable.
However, the following contributions are also recognised as critical :
• the outstanding performance of Australians and New Zealanders.
• the newly arrived and technologically superior M4 Sherman Tanks provided by America. In contrast, the Germans failed to meet their original deadline of introducing the advanced Tiger tank.
• Rommel's absence in the first 48 hours of the battle.
• fuel and ammunition shortages.
Rommel had'stretched his elastic' to the maximum. As discussed in the previous article, an important reason why the North African campaigns oscillated so dramatically was the logistical predicament. Changes in length to the supply lines eventually handicapped the invader and favoured the defender. The further an army pushed forward in triumph, the less able it was to deliver the killer blow against the retreating enemy forces. Overstretched, it then became vulnerable to counter-attack.
• the waning of German air power.
By October 1942, German aerial reconnaissance had been severely curtailed. The German air force was outnumbered, overstretched and exhausted. Convoy protection was given high priority. The resumption of bombing raids against Malta also diverted scarce resources.
An embarrassing statistic confirming the weak state of the GAF is that on October 24th , the first main day of battle after the night-time offensive, the Germans only managed 107 sorties whereas the British achieved 1, 000.
The British also experimented with special jamming aircraft which disrupted radio contact between Panzer units.
• Ultra intelligence. Although Montgomery did not know the exact details of Rommel's defensive battle plan, he knew precisely Rommel's troop and tank strengths.
Recently released documents also confirm that Ultra enabled the British to track and sink vital ammunition and fuel supplies.
• Field Intelligence.
Montgomery's 'Y' service, which intercepted battlefield communications, was coming into prominence. In contrast, Rommel's own battlefield intelligence unit was now severely handicapped.
In Fisher's book there is no reference to July 10th, the day on which Australian troops stormed the Afrika Korps' forward intercept station.
Seebohm, commander of Rommel's SIGINT team had moved his unit to elevated ground to maximise the number of transmissions intercepted. The Australians eliminated this position in a surprise attack, capturing men and documents, and fatally wounding Seebohm. The hidden secret behind Rommel's Fingerspitzengefuhl (uncanny sixth sense) was at last revealed.
However, the decisive factor influencing victory at El Alamein was surely the incontrovertible fact that Montgomery had more men and military hardware.
On the eve of the battle, the British were well aware of this superiority . An enigma decrypt from October 20th revealed German troops numbered only 49,000 and Italian troops were 54,000, compared to the British Army's 195,000.
Another enigma decrypt, intercepted on October 23rd, gave precise details of tank strengths:
German : 238 tanks (including 30 obsolete Pzkw II's). Italians : 279 tanks
British : 1,029 tanks (plus 200 in reserve), plus a further 1,000 under repair or being altered.
With hard-headed statistics like these, the unglamorous theory of warfare dubbed 'brute force' seems the most relevant in any discussion of why Montgomery won at El Alamein.
John Ellis argues that "the outcome was never in much doubt, because of the tremendous material superiority which the Commonwealth forces were able to bring to bear..." [/quote]
http://www.maskelynemagic.com/12alamein1.html