Algunos datos más sobre el tema, y con permiso de José Luis, pongo la cita literal en inglés.
"Crews were well aware of the likelihood of their tanks, especially Shermans, ‘brewing up’ once penetrated, and that when hit or under fire, survival could be measured in seconds. To increase their chances of surviving being hit in combat, tank crews paid great attention to the task of bailing out, some even going as far as entering combat with all hatches open to expedite escape.(49) Brian Marchant, 9RTR, had specifically asked to join a Churchill unit partly because the Churchill tank had more escape hatches, while all crews considered it essential to ensure that prior to battle all hatches worked properly.(50) Moreover, although tank crews were drilled not to bail out until the commander had issued such an order, most learned to abandon the tank as soon as it had been hit or had struck a mine. Indeed, commanders often bailed out as fast as possible, without giving the order to abandon, for the turret crew might require them to get out first, there being insufficient turret hatches in some tanks.(51) However, it was not unusual in battle for hatches to be damaged or blocked. Indeed, hull crew could be trapped by the turret jamming and the main gun obstructing a hatch, while turret crew might be hindered by a body, most likely the commander, blocking the escape route.(52) In hindsight, nicknaming the Sherman the Ronson or the Tommy Cooker seems sardonically humorous, but it represented clear and obvious contemporary anxieties. Senior officers discouraged the use of these terms, but to little avail.(53) Operational research reports confirmed the views of Sherman crews, as evidence suggested that around two-thirds to three-quarters of Shermans ‘brewed up’ when penetrated.(54) The tank crew would have a few seconds to bail out before the Sherman burst into flames, most often as a result of cordite flash, though petrol-fuelled fires also caused concern.(55) Any crew caught inside would meet a horrifying death. Indeed, the longer the period units spent equipped with Shermans the greater the fear of being burnt, one post-war report concluded, even though such worries were out of proportion to the likelihood of incineration. The report continued that crews often abandoned their tank as soon as their vehicle was hit for fear of being burned alive, even though it had not been penetrated, and that in all probability this tactic saved lives.(56)
Crews were also vexed by the apparent inadequacies of their own tanks, especially when compared to German opposition, and the weakness of armour protection sported by Allied tanks became of increasing concern as the campaign unfolded.(57). Although, in reality, armour protection was of little value against modern, heavy anti-tank weaponry at usual battle ranges, crews believed that their tanks were inadequately armoured. This was partly a result of the manner in which Allied tank armament proved to be inadequate against German Tigers and Panthers, and the lack of hitting power against the former in particular inflated the real value of the Tiger greatly. Allied crews in Panthers and Tigers would have encountered significant and similar problems if they had to maintain the burden of offence and if confronted by first-rate anti-tank weaponry, such as 88 mm or 17-pdr guns. Nevertheless, Allied tank crews understandably wanted the same level of apparent protection as offered by the superior German tanks."
Notas:
49. WO 205/1165, Survey of casualties amongst armoured units in northwest Europe, by Capt.
H. B. Wright RAMC and Capt. R. D. Harkness RAMC, no. 2 ORS 21st Army Group, 1945.
50. Beale, Tank Tracks, p. 18.
51 Dyson, Tank Twins, pp. 58–9.
52 Sgt Bob Anderson, C Squadron, 9RTR, quoted in Beale, Tank Tracks, p. 61; Maj. John
Langdon, 3RTR, interview with author, October 1944.
53 Boscawen, Armoured Guardsmen, p. 41.
54 WO 291/1331, 21st Army Group ORS report no. 12, Analysis of 75 mm Sherman tank casualties
suffered between 6 June and 10 July 1944; BOV, Box 623-438, Operation Overlord – reports on
equipment, letter from ADAFV(T) 2nd Army to DDAFV(D).
55 Delaforce, Monty’s Marauders, p. 73; Boscawen, Armoured Guardsmen, p. 7.
56 WO 205/1165, Capt. H. B. Wright RAMC and Capt. R. D. Harkness RAMC, A survey of
casualties amongst armoured units in Northwest Europe, no. 2 ORS, 21st Army Group, 1945.
57 Boscawen Armoured Guardsmen, pp. 40, 48; W. S. Brownlie, The Proud Trooper, pp. 364–5;
Dyson, Tank Twins, pp. 46–7.
Fuente: BUCKLEY, J. “
British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944” Frank Cass, 2004 pp. 187-188