http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/r ... lupfer.asp
As the famous tactician, Wilhelm Balck,* noted, altering tactical procedures in the middle of such a desperate struggle, was a very serious undertaking, especially for the German Army.2 To alter the deeply ingrained habits in an army famous for its thorough peacetime training was difficult, especially when the confusion of the war made the accuracy of any change uncertain.
*Wilhelm Balck had written extensively on tactics before the war. During the war he served as a division commander. His son, Hermann Balck, was a company-grade officer in the First World War, and became an outstanding field commander in the Second World War.
The Germans did not win the First World War and their strategic conduct of the war was often flawed. Yet, much value can be derived from their development of tactical doctrine, for the Germans developed and applied new tactical doctrine impressively in 1917 and 1918. Their tactical changes were systematic and thorough, for these changes in doctrine directly effected subsequent battlefield success. The analysis of the doctrinal changes cannot be restricted to examining changes to regulations because doctrine that influences nothing beyond the printing press is stillborn.
German successes in World War I demonstrated a thorough process:
Perception of a need for change
Solicitation of ideas, especially from the battlefield units
Definition of the change
Dissemination of the change
Enforcement throughout the army
Modification of organization and equipment to accommodate
the change
Thorough training
Evaluation of effectiveness
Subsequent refinement
This outline describes the manner by which the German Army succeeded in changing and implementing tactical doctrine during war. The process is not rigidly sequential; it is a dynamic process that requires great intellectual ability and strong character from tacticians who desire to make successful changes.
Many characteristics ascribed to the German military have too often sufficed for explanations of German military success. Glib expressions such as "great organization" or "a knack for war" do little justice to the men who brought success to German arms and, more importantly, offer little guidance for anyone who desires to achieve similar success.
