Historia general
"British Policy Towards the USSR and the Onset of the Second World War". Aster, Sidney. University of London (1969) Descarga:
EThOS
"Britain's attempt to maximise US participation in the Second World War, 1939-1941 : a case study in targeting history". Blaycock, W. University of London (1980) Descarga:
EThOS
"Treating and preventing trauma : British military psychiatry during the Second World War”
Thalassis, Nafsika. University of Salford (2004)
Abstract:
“This is a study of military psychiatry in the Second World War. Focusing on the British Army, it recounts how the military came to employ psychiatrists to revise recruitment procedures and to treat psychiatric casualties. The research has shown that psychiatry was a valued specialty and that psychiatrists were given considerable power and independence. For example, psychiatrists reformed personnel selection and placed intelligence testing at the centre of the military selection of personnel. Psychiatrists argued that by eliminating the ''dull and backward'' the tests would help improve efficiency, hygiene, discipline and morale, reduce psychiatric casualties and establish that the Army was run in a meritocratic way. However, it is probable that intelligence testing made it less likely that working-class men would receive commissions. Still, the Army had no consistent military doctrine about what the psychiatrists should be aiming for -to return as many psychiatric casualties to combatant duties as was possible or to discharge men who had found it impossible to adapt to military life. In the initial stages of the war, the majority of casualties were treated in civilian hospitals in Britain, where most were discharged. This was partly because the majority were regarded as constitutional neurotics. When psychiatrists treated soldiers near the front line most were retained in some capacity. The decision on whether to evacuate patients was influenced by multiple factors including the patients'' military experience and the doctors'' commitment to treatment or selection. Back in Britain, service patients were increasingly more likely to be treated in military hospitals such as Northfield -famous for the ''Northfield experiments''. These provided an alternative model of military psychiatry in which psychiatric intervention refocused away from individuals and their histories and onto social relationships, and where the psychiatrists'' values were realigned with the military rather than with civilian general medicine.” Descarga:
EThOS
"Le feld-marechal Erich von Manstein: Un officier prussien a l'ombre de l'image de la Wehrmacht. Etude critique de l'homme et du soldat"
Lemay, Benoit. Universite de Montreal (2004)
Abstract:
“The political and moral responsibility of the Wehrmacht during the Nazi period has systematically been overshadowed by the Cold War and by German rearmament in compliance with NATO requirements, which led to the reactivation of veterans of Hitler's army. More than any of his Wehrmacht comrades, Field Marshall Erich von Manstein---considered by most experts as the greatest tactical genius of the Second World War---contributed, through his post-war accounts and memoirs, to the myths that the German army was but a victim of Nazi expansionist policy, that officers were only obeying orders, as was their duty, that Hitler alone was responsible for the military defeat of the Reich and that the Wehrmacht never participated in the criminal activity of the Nazi regime.
Yet Manstein, more than most of his colleagues in the officer corps, was an accomplice to Hitler's enterprise of aggression and destruction in Europe. Indeed, not only was he a fully willing participant in the planning and execution of wars of aggression against Poland, France and the Soviet Union, but he also supported Wehrmacht war crimes in Eastern Europe at the expense of Jews, supporters and citizens of the occupied territories, Polish and Soviet prisoners of war and the political commissaries of the Red Army.
Manstein, however, was not a true Nazi, but rather a great soldier who lacked political instincts. In this sense, he is very representative of the Prussian military class of his era. Through him, one can therefore map out the fate of other high-ranking officers who fought during the Second World War, particularly on the Eastern front. It is for this reason that it is important to study this man who served his Fuhrer until the end. An analysis of Manstein's indulgence, both during and after the war, of Nazi atrocities, allows us to more fully understand why the German army allowed itself to be the instrument of Hitler's expansionist policy.
This thesis fills a great void in German military historiography: a critical study of this complex persona, probably of Jewish and Slavic descent, whose diverse facets have often led to differing interpretations. Such a study is important not only for military history and for the understanding of an exceptionally talented strategist, but also affords entry into the thoughts, conceptions and psychology of a high-ranking officer who played a leading role in the planning and execution of wars of aggression and violations of the rules of war committed by the Wehrmacht for the benefit of the Nazi regime.” Descarga (previo registro)
http://access.cjh.org/query.php?term=Le ... =all&go=#1
“Erich von Manstein. Vernichtungskrieg und Geschichtspolitik”. Oliver von Wrochem. Hamburg Helmut Schmidt Universität (2004) Libro:
http://www.amazon.de/Erich-von-Manstein ... 3506729772
"The Polish Country Section of the Special Operations Executive 1940-1946 A British Perspective"
Bines, Jeffrey. University of Stirling (2008)
Abstract:
“This thesis is a history of the Polish Country Section of the Special Operations Executive (SOE), a British organisation whose purpose was to infiltrate agents behind enemy lines during World War II. The thesis covers the period 1940 ? 1946, the entire period that SOE existed, and its close connection with the Polish special department, formally known as the Sixth Bureau of the Polish Government in Exile. Chapters contained herein each cover a full year of operations from 1941 -1943, followed by two chapters for 1944, and one chapter for 1945-1946. Covered are details of agent training, information on the first flight to Poland to drop agents and couriers and the problems encountered. The German invasion of the Soviet Union and SOE?s thoughts on the predicted outcome is covered, as are also Polish operations in France and indications of support for Polish operations in other parts of the world. Throughout, is evidence of the difficulties in obtaining sufficient air support for flights to Poland which, although inadequate for Polish requirements, were more abundant than many realised at the time. This is especially true with reference to supplies dropped to Warsaw during the rising of 1944. Brief accounts of the meetings between the ?Big Three?, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, at Teheran and Yalta in as much as they affected SOE/Polish relations. The thesis finishes with appendices detailing agent/courier parachute drops, lists of personnel involved, a bibliography and glossary.” Descarga:
EThOS
"Leadership and command on the Eastern Front (1941-1945) : the military style of Marchal Konstantin Rokossovskiy"
Walsh, S. M. University of Cranfield (2010)
Abstract:
“Marshal Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy, Hero of the Soviet Union, Order ofVictory, Knight of the Bath, OBE, victor of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, the destructionof German Army Group Centre and East Prussia, participated in some of the mostsignificant operations in the history of war, let alone the twentieth century. Yet, in theEnglish speaking world Rokossovskiy is unknown, a name, vaguely associated withfamous events. There is no sustained historical analysis of Rokossovskiy?s style ofleadership and operational command in the English language. Rokossovskiy rejected the authoritarian leadership culture of Stalin?s Soviet Union andZhukov?s Red Army. Rokossovskiy was highly demanding and occasionally harsh buthis leadership encouraged initiative, consultation, trust, delegation and toleratedmistakes in a way that made him unusual, indeed exceptional, in the Red Army. It wasprimarily an authoritative style of leadership but Rokossovskiy practised different formsand styles of leadership guided by his own instinctive judgement according to thedemands of the situation and the nature of his subordinates. This was a consideredphilosophy of leadership and command that set him apart from his contemporaries. Rokossovskiy?s style of leadership was intimately connected to his conduct ofoperations. As one of the Red Army?s finest commanders, respected by the Wehrmachtand the Red Army, Rokossovskiy?s operational art was dominated by the idea of depth. Rokossovskiy, the Pole, was the heir to a long Russian tradition, centuries old, of deepoperations, whereas Zhukov, the Russian, was committed to operational encirclementand annihilation, a Germanic concept. Marshal Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy had a distinct military style of hisown: his style of leadership challenged the Red Army?s authoritarian culture whilst hisstyle of operations endorsed the historical traditions of the Russian army. It makes himone of the most significant military commanders of the twentieth century.” Descarga:
EThOS
Teatro de operaciones
“Soldiers Into Nazis? The German Infantry's War in Northwest Russia, 1941-1944”
Rutherford, Jeff. The University of Texas at Austin (1974)
Descarga:
http://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/9768
“Opportunity in Danger: Manstein's East Front Strategy from 19 Nov 1942 to 18 Mar 1943”
Bolstad, Steven B. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey (California, 1991)
Abstract:
“In the 1990s the United States Armed Forces will be asked by its leaders to do more with less. This represents a significant turn from the policies of the last decade. During World War Two the German Army operated effectively under similar policy constraints. There are many lessons in strategic planning that can be learned from Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's operations during the Winter of 1942-43. He was able to grasp tremendous opportunity amid extreme strategic danger. He decisively changed the strategic situation on the Eastern Front over a four month period. This thesis addresses the following questions. What factors enabled him to operate so effectively? What hindered him? What decisions did he make, when and why? How might leaders today make similar decisions under similar circumstances and be as successful? The answers to these questions will be of great value to the United States Armed Forces as they restructure themselves for the 1990s.” Descarga:
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA246388
“No Stalingrad on the Dnieper: The Korsun-Shevchenkovsky Operation January to February 1944”.
Nash, Douglas E. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (1995)
Abstract:
“This study investigates the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky Operation of World War II, an attempt by the Red Army to conduct another encirclement on the scale of Stalingrad. Its outcome, and the lessons learned from it, mark this a significant development in the Soviet art of war. Conducted 24 January to 18 February 1944, Korsun bore witness to increasing Soviet operational proficiency alongside the beginnings of German disintegration. Before Korsun, the Germans had been able, with greatest effort, to maintain a coherent front line; after their desperate breakout from the pocket, their entire defensive effort in the East began to crumble. The Soviets assembled two army groups to carry out the operation, which relied on an unusual degree of operational deception, diversionary attacks, and deep operations by two tank armies. The Germans, wanting to avoid a repetition of the Stalingrad disaster, desperately tried to thwart the Soviets, hastily assembling a relief force of eight armored divisions to extricate the encircled forces. Despite Soviet numerical superiority, most of the Germans managed to break out, though losing all of their equipment in the process. It was to be the last successful large-scale relief operation mounted by the Germans on the Eastern Front. Present throughout this operation were elements of Soviet operational design which would become standard elements of nearly every subsequent operation. Although Korsun Operation was far from being perfectly executed, it served as a Si n ost of the increasing operational capabilities of the Red Army.”
Descarga:
http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc ... tTRDoc.pdf
Descarga de la traducción al castellano:
http://www.delaguerra.net/index.php?opt ... &Itemid=53 (gracias, Audie Murphy
)
“The Failure of German Logistics During the Ardennes Offensive of 1944”.
Kennedy, James L. Fort Leavenworth (2000).
Abstract:
“This study investigates the role that logistics played in the failure of the German Offensive in the Ardennes in 1944. The thesis explains that despite the incredible buildup of forces and supplies, the inability of the German strategic and operational logistics systems to properly equip, fuel, arm, and move forces caused the failure of the Ardennes Offensive. The concept of this thesis starts with the overall strategic military and political situation of Germany in the fall of 1944 that Hitler used to base his decision to conduct the offensive in December 1944. The study then examines in detail the strategic capabilities during the buildup of supplies and the operational level organization and planning for the offensive. An analysis of the details on the impact of terrain, climate, allied air interdiction, and Operation Point Blank is included in this chapter. Then it examines the first weeks of the offensive and looks at the failure of the fuel and arm and move tactical logistics functions. An analysis of the impact of logistics on supporting operations is included in this chapter.” Descarga:
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA384410..]
“Die Krim unter Deutscher Herrschaft 1941-1944. Germanisierungsutopie und Besatzungsrealität”. Kunz, Norbert. Universität von Mainz (2003) Descarga:
http://www.gbv.de/dms/bs/toc/488014905.pdf
"Intelligence and command at the operational level of war : the British Eighth Army's experience during the Italian Campaign of the Second World War 1943-1945". Jones, Kevin Leslie. University of London (2005) Descarga:
EThOS
"U.S. Failures in the Pearl Harbor Attack: Lessons for Intelligence"
Masahiko Kobayashi. Tufts University (2005)
Abstract:
"In this thesis, I will examine the reasons why the United States failed to prevent the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and will extract lessons from the failure. There were some problems of collection, analysis, and management in the U.S. intelligence. Each defect is not uniquely attributed to the U.S. intelligence per se but is inherent to a cognitive and behavioral limit of human beings. The lessons of Pearl Harbor are not omnipotent tools to prevent a surprise attack, yet they will make a significant contribution to breaking the constraint and will mitigate casualties by enemy’s attacks. This thesis recommends that intelligence officers should learn the historical lessons at heart to deal with a future contingency." Descarga:
http://repository01.lib.tufts.edu:8080/ ... PDF/getPDF
"The Polish Home Army and the struggle for the Lublin region 1943-1945"
Blackwell, James William. University of Glasgow (2010)
Abstract:
“Between 1939 and 1944 the underground forces of the Polish Government-in-Exile created an underground army in the Lublin region, which, at its height, numbered 60,000 men. The underground Army was created in order to facilitate the reestablishment of an independent Poland. The Army that was created, the AK, was in effect, an alliance organisation comprising, to varying degrees, members of all pro-independence underground groups. It was, in Lublin, to always suffer from internal stresses and strains, which were exaggerated by the actions of the region?s occupiers. These strains were highlighted and exploited by the ?liberating? Red Army. From the moment that they set foot in the province in July 1944, the forces of the Soviet Union aimed to put into place a Polish regime that was compliant and communist. The most interesting fact about the operation mounted by the AK to liberate Lublin province from the Germans, lies in the regional command?s reaction to both their orders and the demands made of them by the incoming Soviets. The regional commander?s decision in July 1944 to order his forces to hand in their weapons and disperse meant that the human stock of the underground would remain, that it would survive the first wave of NKVD arrests. This meant that, despite the massive setback of the post liberation era, a core, armed, and well structured underground still existed. What destroyed this attempt to preserve the AK in Lublin was the halting of the eastern front for five months. This meant that 2.2 million Soviets were operating in and around Lublin whilst the AK central command was fighting to liberate Warsaw. The halting of the front, therefore, was to hasten the fate of those in the underground, both in the capital and to the east. Ultimately it was the mass repression in the aftermath of the Warsaw Uprising that fatally weakened the Lublin underground as an organised, coherent entity. In many senses the crucial period for the AK in Lublin was the one from July until November 1944. The alliance of the underground in the area had been an often-difficult one but after months of silence from London, and the failure of the Warsaw Uprising and the Moscow talks, this alliance began to collapse. Whilst the framework of the underground had been almost destroyed by the winter of 1944-1945, crucially a framework of resistance had survived the NKVD?s concerted attempts to destroy it totally. The importance of this framework was clearly shown after the Red Army restarted its attack at the heart of the Third Reich in January 1945, removing the vast majority of troops from the region. The second underground was much more disjointed in its nature with weaker command structures. Yet because a framework was in place, because some respected officers and their men had survived the winter of 1944-45, the underground was to remain more organised in Lublin than in most other areas of Poland. Whilst the anti-communist underground was ultimately defeated, in Lublin it was to remain a sizeable threat to the communist regime until 1947.”
Descarga:
EThOS
"Husband E. Kimmel and the Aftermath of Pearl Harbor"
Keegan, John G. Millersville University of Pennsylvania (2010)
Abstract:
"This analysis places Admiral Husband E. Kimmel’s actions before December 7, 1941 and his actions in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor into historical context. Without the distortion of hindsight, his decisions based on available information and resources were reasonable. Kimmel’s only error in judgment was underestimating Japan’s capability to conduct carrier operations. That error was shared by others in the military, President Roosevelt, and Congress. Although Kimmel’s treatment in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor was unfair, it was perfectly legal and Kimmel was not unjustly punished by being relieved of command. Additionally, the Hart Inquiry, Naval Court of Inquiry, Hewitt Inquiry and the Joint Congressional Committee Investigation to varying degrees corrected the injustice of the Roberts Commission charge of dereliction of duty. Ultimately, therefore, Kimmel was not denied due process. Nevertheless, the conclusions of all of the investigations lack the force of a court-martial verdict. By voluntarily waiving the statute of limitations, Kimmel gave away any leverage he had to force the government to try him under the statute. Thus he participated in denying himself such a verdict. It was not until August 1945 that the Judge Advocate General of the Navy Thomas Gatch concluded there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction on the charges of Neglect of Duty and Culpable Inefficiency in Performance of Duty. That same month, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal offered Kimmel trial by general court-martial. Kimmel never accepted. Thus, Kimmel chose not to be court-martialed. Examination of prevailing opinion and United States strategy reveals that the United States considered Germany a greater threat. Thus with the nation’s attention was focused on Europe the Pacific Fleet was denied the necessary men and materiel to carry out its mission. Recognizing that the Germany first strategy caused the shortages with which Kimmel had to contend in no way brings into question the wisdom of that strategy. It simply recognizes the cost of that choice. Prevailing opinion illustrates the American people’s reluctance fully to involve themselves in the war. It also revealed an overestimation of American military capability and a misunderstanding of the appropriate use of air power. Those factors were reflected in Congress’s failure to appropriate sufficient funds or provide, in a timely manner, the manpower necessary for the military to be sufficiently prepared at the beginning of the conflict. Setting aside the historiography that maintains the Japanese were willing and able to attack the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and analyzing prevailing opinion about Japan’s abilities as well as United States strategy demonstrates Kimmel’s errors in judgment were not unique. They were shared by the civilian and military leadership. Additionally, Kimmel’s decisions before December 7, 1941 were reasonable and he did the best he could with the resources available to him. Kimmel was not derelict in the performance of his duty." Descarga:
http://jgkeegan.com/pdf/Thesis021710.pdf
Fuerzas terrestres
"An Unspectacular' War. Reconstructing the history of the 2nd Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment during the Second World War"
Craggs, Tracy. University of Sheffield (2007)
Abstract:
“This thesis focuses on one battalion of infantrymen who trained for, and served during, the D-Day landings and north-west Europe campaign. Battalion histories in this detail are rare, as they usually form part of self-serving and uncritical histories produced by the parent regiment. This small unit acts as a microcosm of the' infantry of the line during the period, reflecting the typical high casualty rates and long periods on the front line. The existing sparse evidence about the 2nd Battalion was enhanced by interviews with veterans of the unit, which proved central to the study. Their memories revealed a wealth ofrich and previously unknown detail. Existing secondary literature is critical of the battalion's, and 3rd Division's, efforts on D-Day and the units of the 3rd Division were dubbed 'The Unspectaculars' in the press. These criticisms are challenged in the first three chapters of the thesis, which examine the level of training the infantrymen received; the battalion's performance on D-Day; and the progress ofthe battalion from D-Day onwards. The performance of the battalion is argued to have been solid yet unspectacular for much of the campaign. However in February 1945 came its spectacular moment, at the Battle of the Bridge. Chapters Four and Five address what life was like for the infantrymen ofthe battalion and assess what happened to these soldiers when they returned home, since for many, the war did not end when Germany surrendered. The thesis provides a social and cultural history of the 2nd Battalion, albeit within the military sphere. While individual memories remain an important source, the narrative of the battalion also' forms a group memory, particularly focusing on one outstanding officer, Major 'Banger' King. A group record is also apparent during commemorative events, in particular the 60th anniversary of D-Day, in June 2004.” Descarga:
EThOS
Fuerzas aéreas
"The development of RAF coastal command trade defence strategy, policy and doctrine 1919-1945". Buckley, John Dale. University of Lancaster (1991) Descarga:
EThOS
"Allied close air support 1943-1945". Gooderson, Ian Robert. University of London (1994) Descarga:
EThOS
"The establishment and initial development of a British airborne force, June 1940-January 1942". Buckingham, William Frederick. University of Glasgow (2001) Descarga:
EThOS
“The development of Britain's airborne forces during the Second World War”. Greenacre, John William. U. of Leeds (2008) Descarga:
EThOS
"Making vision into power : Britain''s acquisition of the world''s first radar-based integrated air defence system 1935 - 1941"
Judkins, Phillip Edward. Cranfield University (2008)
Abstract:
“This thesis represents the first application of a current conceptual model of defence acquisition to analyse the historical process, the 1935 - 1941 British acquisition of an integrated air defence system pivoted upon the innovative technology of radar. For successful acquisition of a military capability, the model posits that balanced attention must be focused acoss eight ''lines of developmen'' - not only equipment, but also doctrine and concepts, logistics, structures, personnel, organisation, training and information with an overarching requirement for interoperability. This thesis contrasts what turned out to be a successful acquisition, of radar to achive air interception capability by day in the Battle of Britain, with less successful acquisition, or radar to achieve the same capability at night, where an effective system arrived too late to ward off the Blitz. The results establish the validity of the model and its attendant lines of development concepts, and furnish new insights into acquisition processes and military history. Acquisition lessons are derived for the capability-based involvement of industry, for the experience and personality necessary for key managers at different ''life stages'' of an acquisition and for the avoidance of over-rapid ''dysfunctional diffusion'' of innovative technologies. Historical insights for the Battle of Britain include the sub-optimal performance, for trivial reasons, of key South Coast radars, and the critical importance of the human elements of the radar-based air defence system. For the Blitz, airborne radar hardware has previously been identified as a key problem, whereas research here exposes the greater need for accurate ground control radar, the sound selection and training of pilots and operators in new tactics, and provision of equipment maintainers and test gear. New evidence illustrates that pursuit of an alternative to radar significantly delayed the optimal solution, and throws fresh light both on personalities and on development process management.” Descarga:
EThOS
Fuerzas navales
“
Tráfico marítimo en el Atlántico Norte durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial”
Enrique García Melón, Universidad de La Laguna (1996)
Resumen:
“Este trabajo trata del estudio del trafico marítimo en el Atlántico Norte. Su estructura se compone de los siguientes capítulos: el I, trata de las fuerzas de superficie, que tuvieron una escasa participación en la Batalla del Atlántico; el II, de las flotas submarinas: alemana, italiana, británica, etc., que participaron en la misma; el III, de los corsarios alemanes, buques "Q", aviación aliada y alemana, así como el factor humano en esta batalla; el IV, de las marinas mercantes del Eje y aliada, su contribución a la guerra, convoyes y buques de la libertad; el V, trata de las fases, armas y técnicas empleadas en la Batalla del Atlántico; el VI, de los ataques al tráfico mercante aliado, con fecha, hora, nombre, pabellón, situación, arma empleada, etc., en cada hundimiento o captura. Seguidamente, se pasa al capitulo de resultados y discusión, para el que se han confeccionado 94 tablas y 28 gráficas. Finaliza con las correspondientes conclusiones y bibliografia empleada.”
“Incidencia de las operaciones submarinas en el tráfico marítimo en los océanos Índico y Pacífico, durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial”
Juan Antonio Irigoyen Jimenez, Universidad de La Laguna (1997)
Resumen:
“En este estudio se tratan de analizar, en primer lugar, las causas que ocasionaron la entrada de Japón en la Segunda Guerra Mundial, así como el estado de su economía, marina mercante y fuerzas navales. También se detallan los buques participantes contra el tráfico mercante en los océanos Índico y Pacífico: flotas submarinas francesa, italiana, alemana y japonesa, por parte del eje, y holandesa, britanica y americana, por el bando aliado. Se destaca, asimismo, la problemática particular de la guerra submarina. a continuación, se relacionan cronológicamente, en capitulos independientes, los hundimientos de buques mercantes, tanto del Eje como aliados, en ambos teatros de operaciones, Índico y Pacífico, así como sus banderas y tonelajes, que se totalizan al final, por meses y años. Se completa el estudio con los relativamente escasos buques de guerra hundidos por los submarinos, durante estas campañas. Se completa el trabajo con 71 paginas de tablas y 12 de gráficas, lo que facilita la comprensión, permitiendo apreciar con mayor claridad las perdidas de buques mercantes en ambos escenarios.”
"Officer training and the quest for operational efficiency in the Royal Canadian Navy 1939-1945". Glover, William Reaveley. University of London (1998) Descarga:
EThOS
“Incidencia de las operaciones submarinas en el tráfico marítimo en el Mediterráneo, durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial”
Enrique Melón Rodríguez, Universidad de La Laguna (2000)
Resumen:
“El teatro de operaciones del Mediterráneo, durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, desde el punto de vista del tráfico marítimo, tuvo una especial relevancia y sus consecuencias alcanzaron a otros escenarios geográficos lejanos. Las características especiales de este mar, tanto desde el punto de vista físico como del geográfico, fueron de especial interés para la navegación de buques mercantes y para las unidades que los atacaron. El tráfico aliado se centró, especialmente, en las derrotas este-oeste, entre Alejandría-Malta-Gilbraltar, mientras que el del Eje, con el objetivo de mantener el esfuerzo bélico de las tropas italo-alemanas en el norte de África, discurrió en dirección norte-sur, entre Italia y Túnez-Libia. Ambos tráficos fueron tocados por submarinos enemigos, sufriendo una considerable cantidad de bajas, tanto en número de buques y tonelaje, como en hombres. Después de analizar las fuerzas de superficie y submarinas aliadas y del Eje, se estudian las marinas mercantes implicadas, así como las rutas y convoyes, con especial atención al "Pedestal". A continuación, ordenados cronológicamente, aparecen los mercantes aliados hundidos por submarinos alemanes e italianos, para seguir con los mercantes del Eje hundidos por submarinos británicos, holandeses y de otras banderas. Se dedican apartados específicos a los buques de guerra hundidos por los submarinos anteriores, así como un capítulo dedicado a los mercantes hundidos en el Atlántico Sur, escenario de poca relevancia en nuestro estudio. El trabajo termina con las conclusiones, precedidas de más de 150 tablas de resultados y 46 histogramas.” Libro relacionado:
Buques mercantes aliados hundidos en el mediterraneo por submarinos del eje durante la II Guerra mundial
"Holding the line: The Royal Navy's Home Fleet in the second World War". Levy, James. University of Wales Swansea (2001) Descarga:
EThOS
“The role of the Royal Navy in the amphibious assaults in the second World War” . Howcroft, Ivor. U. of Exeter (2002) Descarga:
EThOS
"The British Anti-Shipping Campaign in the Mediterranean 1940-1944: Comparing Methods of Attack".
Hammond, Richard James. University of Exeter (2011)
Abstract:
“From the Italian declaration of war on 10 June 1940 through to the end of December 1944, the British and their allies waged a major campaign against Axis shipping in the Mediterranean. Uniquely for the British, this campaign took the form of a combined arms offensive throughout its conduct, and utilized all four methods of attacking shipping; surface vessels, submarines, aircraft and mine warfare. This thesis approaches the campaign thematically, examining each of the four methods individually.The priority given to the campaign, the forces and equipment available throughout, the tactics used and their development, the successes achieved in numbers and tonnage of merchant vessels sunk and the losses in numbers and casualties are all considered for each method. By examining these factors and the relevant quantitative data, the efficacy of each form of attack is determined and a final comparison of the four different methods made. The thesis concludes that overall, torpedo aircraft were the most effective method due to their ratio of high success and low number of personnel casualties, despite considerable losses of aircraft. Submarines were also very successful but ultimately more costly. The thesis demonstrates that mine warfare might well have achieved significant results had a greater priority been placed on it and that surface vessels no longer retained the ability to operate successfully for sustained periods in an anti-shipping role unless in an area of aerial and naval superiority.” Descarga:
EThOS