Saludos a todos y felices fiestas.
José Luis
Es que tu pregunta tiene una trampa que se llama excepcionalidad.
Cada situación histórica es única, puede haber semejanzas entre dos situaciones, pero nunca serán completamente iguales y es evidente que a las decisiones que se enfrentaba el alto mando alemán en 1938-1939, fueron únicas en muchos sentidos.
Aun así no hay un solo ejemplo que pueda recordar o que otros foreros hayan citado, de un ejército que se amotina contra un gobierno legítimo que es muy popular entre la población y que lleva 6 años de éxitos continuos.
Criticar a Guderian o a cualquier otro oficial alemán por no amotinarse en Septiembre de 1939, me parece en primer lugar desproporcionado pues se les pide un estándar que no se espera de ninguna otra fuerza armada en la historia moderna y en segundo lugar ingenuo, porque una organización como un ejército sufre de los mismos males que cualquier otra organización burocrática, es decir, de inercia institucional y dependencia de un orden jerárquico, donde después de haber purgado al alto mando, a la cabeza estaba Hitler.
Si Guderian hubiera podido ver el futuro de como terminarían las cosas en 1945, lo más razonable sería amotinarse, desafortunadamente él como el resto de los oficiales alemanes tenían que decidir con la información disponible en 1939, es mucho más sencillo para nosotros censurarle sabiendo como resultaron las cosas... pero la historia una y otra vez demuestra que de vez en cuando es impredecible, ejemplos abundan.
El siguiente fragmento es parte de las memorias de Manstein "Lost Victories"
"That everyone among us, disquieted by the number of emergencies through which the
Fatherland had passed since 1933, wondered where all this would lead, I need hardly say. Our thoughts and private conversations at this time were centred on the signs of the gathering storm on the horizon around us. We realized that Hitler was fanatically resolved to dispose of the very last of the territorial problems Germany had inherited through the Treaty of Versailles. We knew that he had begun negotiations with Poland as far back as autumn 1938 to clear up the whole Polish-German frontier question, though what progress, if any, these negotiations had made we were not told. At the same time we were aware of the British guarantee to Poland. And I can safely say that not one of us in the army was so arrogant, thoughtless or shortsighted as not to recognize the deadly seriousness of the warning that guarantee implied. This factor alone - though it was not the only one - convinced our party in Neuhammer that there would in the end be no war. Even if the deployment plan on which we were now engaged went into operation, that still need not, in our opinion, mean war. We had watched Germany's precarious course along the razor's edge to date with close attention and were increasingly amazed at Hitler's incredible luck in attaining - hitherto without recourse to arms - all his overt and covert political aims. The man seemed to have an almost infallible instinct. Success had followed success in a never-ending progression - if one may initially refer to the glittering train of events that ultimately led to our downfall as successes. All those things had been achieved without war. Why, we asked ourselves, should it be different this time ? Look at Czechoslovakia. Though Hitler had drawn up a menacing array of troops against her in 1938, there had still been no war. Yet the old adage about taking the pitcher to the well once too often still echoed in our ears, for the position was now a much trickier one and the game Hitler seemed intent on playing had a more dangerous look about it. There was the British guarantee to contend with this time. But then we recalled Hitler's assertion that he would never be so mad as to unleash a war on two fronts, as the German leaders of 1914 had done. That at least implied that he was a man of reason, even if he had no human feelings left.
Raising that coarse voice of his, he had explicitly assured his military advisers that he was not idiot enough to bungle his way into a world war for the sake of Danzig or the Polish Corridor."
En septiembre de 1939 no era posible que los aliados volvieran a ceder ante las exigencias de Hitler? Si ya lo habían hecho en repetidas ocasiones, porque no esperar el mismo resultado una vez más?? Incluso en 1939 la posición de Alemania con respecto a Francia e Inglaterra había mejorado respecto a 1935, el ejército Checoslovaco ya no existía, Alemania ya no estaba aislada, contaba al menos con Italia y acababa de firmar un acuerdo de no agresión con la URSS, desbaratando los cálculos de todos los gobiernos que consideraban que Alemania y la URSS eran enemigos irreconciliables y el potencial bloqueo naval de los aliados se podía evitar si se comerciaba con el resto del mundo a través del territorio soviético. Si los aliados habían cedido cuando Alemania era más débil y vulnerable porque ahora iban a mostrarse firmes que la posición de Alemania era notablemente más fuerte que antes?
Y si todo era un farol gigantesco por parte de Hitler para forzar concesiones? Pero incluso cuando todo salió mal y los ingleses y franceses cumplieron su palabra de ir a la guerra contra Alemania en caso de que agrediera a Polonia, en verdad se trataba de una guerra de vida o muerte entre los aliados y Alemania? o se trataba de únicamente un esfuerzo para "salvar la cara" como mantenía Hitler.
Porque lo cierto es que aparte del bloqueo, los aliados se sentaron en la frontera con Alemania a ver pasar el tiempo y no tomaron acción ofensiva alguna (la farsa de la ofensiva del Sarre deja a los aliados peor parados), la negativa de bombardear el Ruhr, por temor a represalias de los alemanes o el no querer destruir propiedad privada, el lanzar folletos para explicarles a los alemanes que no debían obedecer a un gobierno criminal, la pobre movilización de los ingleses, que en un periodo de tiempo comparable, solo desplegaron en Francia menos de la mitad de las divisiones que habían movilizado en la PGM... no parecía una guerra, tan es así que nació la expresión "drole de guerre".
Una y otra vez, Hitler demostró que tenía razón en los años previos a la guerra, en contra de las opiniones de gente como Beck, que los aliados iban a ceder y que su combinación de presionar mediante intimidaciones y faroles resultó efectiva.
El ejército alemán estuvo a punto de amotinarse en 1938 durante la crisis con Checoslovaquia, si los aliados hubieran sido más firmes, si hubieran creído o puesto más fe en los mismos alemanes que contactaron al gobierno inglés tal vez todo se hubiera evitado, creo que no se podía esperar que el ejército se amotinara al año siguiente, después de como se resolvió el asunto, con los ingleses dejando abandonados y sin soporte a aquellos alemanes dispuestos a oponerse al gobierno de Hitler.
Coloco diferentes extractos del libro de Gisevius "To the Bitter end" (la edición que utilizo fue publicada por Da Capo Press en 1998), acerca de como se desarrollaron las cosas durante el verano de 1938.
"The first was that everyone who was connected with industry was contented -not only the business men, but the workers and clerical forces, who were receiving high wages. Things were "working out".
My second observation was that no one gave much thought to the growing diplomatic tension. Practical mobilization? Well, what of it? Hitler was merely bluffing. He was too sharp a political intriguer to permit an actual war to start!
Hitler wants peace... Hitler is only threatening... We can smile sadly today at the memory of those assurances that we heard again and again form Goebbels in the hot summer of 1938. The very fact that this was the official propaganda line gave us our great chance for even mention the word "war" was equivalent to treason."
"Let us keep in mind this imponderable factor of public morale while we try to comprehend the grim significance of the dramatic events of the next few months. During those crucial months that preceded his triumph at Munich, Hitler had strayed farther than ever before from the tenor of public opinion. The people no longer understood him. During the twelve years of his reign people often speculated on the possibility of his being insane, but never was it so frequent a topic of conversation as in those days, whenever the are possibility of a war was mentioned. War would be sure proof of his madness -consequently, both possibilities were rejected."
Página 302.
"Kluge had in fact, no more than an inkling of the meaning of certain military measures he had been required to take in line of duty. That points up how skillfully camouflaged these maneuvers were, so that the middle and lower brackets of the officers corps could not be certain what was taking place" Y en esto va incluido Guderian que no tenía forma de saber si todo era un farol de Hitler y buscaba una salida negociada o iba en serio y lo mismo para el caso de la agresión a Polonia un año después.
"Nevertheless, he clung to his conviction that war was inconceivable from an economic or military point of view. above all, he insisted, a war was psychologically unthinkable. If it came to that, he expected popular uprisings and mutinies among the troops. Even more emphatically than Hadler had done, Kluge asserted that we were completely unprepared for war. He ought to know, he said what wide gaps there were in the supplies of arms, munitions, and trained officers."
"I mention this incident only to demonstrate once again the hardly credible fact that in 1938 none of the leading generals wanted war. Indeed -although this sounds even more improbable- most of them did not even believe in the possibility of war."
Página 303.
"But after every diplomatic bout that Hitler had won against the advice of the suspicious generals (the re-establishment of conscription, the re-occupation of the Rhineland, the silent tolerance and then the open recognition of the German Air Force, the anglo-German naval agreement, the annexation of Austria), after each of these "peaceful" achievements, Hitler had dropped a whole series of mysterious hints. What was the present situation? Would there really be a war because of the Sudetenland?"
Página 305.
Si el criterio de Hitler se mostró como correcto en todos estos casos, en contra de la opinión de la mayoría de sus generales, es tan raro que para 1939, la mayor parte de estos hayan confiado en el criterio de Hitler?
Como oponerse y más difícil aún como oponerse de forma organizada ante alguien que hasta ese momento ha demostrado estar en lo correcto una y otra vez?
"The same lack of clarity prevailed in regard to the diplomatic negotiations. Hitler distrusted the reports of his "incompetent" diplomats and sent out special emissaries on his own to determine the "true" mood" of the Western Powers. In contrast to the later crises, the German diplomats still held their ground and unanimously warned Hitler not to go too far. Canaris carried his secret reports, all of which were of the same tenor, form Keitel to Ribbentrop, form the chancellery to Braunchitsch or Reader. Wherever we "westerners" sensed a weak spot in the fronde of generals, we at once advanced our expert opinion that this time the British and French would certainly go as far as war.
Páginas 318 y 319.
Since May we had repeatedly advised London that while Hitler talked only of the Sudeten Germans, in reality he was determined to conquer all of Czechoslovakia. In September another such report was conveyed to London. By September 5 the British government must have known definitely what importance was attached to its standing fast. As the crisis approached } its climax, a last emissary flew across the Channel to inform the British of our plans for a coup d´etat. This time even Hadler was informed of the mission.
Página 319.
"Then on the morning of September 15 there came a report which at first we were unable to believe. But to our horror we found that it was true: Chamberlain was flying to Berchtesgaden. We were struck dumb at first, but finally we agreed on our line: that it was merely a tactical gesture. The British must be temporizing in order to "pass the ball" to our generals."
Página 321
"We worked on the assumption that the air of Europe would at last be cleared by this conversations in Berchtesgaden. In all seriousness we imagined that the chief danger for us lay in the possibility that not Chamberlain but Hitler might back down."
Página 322.
"For the first and last time in this life I nearly quarreled with Oster because of his increasing pessimism. When he declared that the Western Powers would yield, I told him he deserved a post in the propaganda ministry. Unfortunately he knew better than I."
Página 324.
"Witzleben insisted that now it was time to take action. He persuaded Hadler to go to see Brauchitsch. After a while Hadler returned to say that he had good news: Brauchitsch was also outraged and would take a part in the Putsch. There upon Witzleben picked up the telephone on Hadler´s desk and called Brauchitsch. He said openly that everything was ready." (listo para ell golpe de estado).
Página 325
"Meanwhile we waited and waited (Gisevius y Witzleben),
we could not understand why neither Brauchitsch not Hadler sent a word. The minutes passed into hours of unutterable suspense; and then the sensational report crashed down our heads. The impossible had happened. Chamberlain and Daladier were flying to Munich.
Our revolt was done for.
For a few hours I went on imagining to me that the troops would revolt anyway. But Witzleben soon demonstrated to me that the troops would never revolt against the victorious Fuehrer "
Página 326.
"The dictator, from now on, did not need to care a button about the opposition. Its political weight could mean nothing. The persistent "carpers", "know it all", "westerners" with their bourgeois mentality (aquí hay que incluir a Beck)
had been exposed as fools by one of their own sort, the Brimingham plutocrat Chamberlain. Never again would the dictator permit his wavering ministers and generals to interfere with his plans. Overnight the opposition had been reduced form a class which Hitler had to placate, intellectually and politically, to a small group of grumblers"
Página 328.
Lo que quiero decir es que, por suerte y habilidad Hitler resolvió en su favor prácticamente todas las crisis que se le presentaron o el mismo provocó en los años previos a la guerra y que rebelarse contra un gobierno que se percibe como muy exitoso hasta ese momento, me parece tan complicado que no puedo encontrar un sólo ejemplo durante el siglo XX. Al menos una parte del alto mando alemán lo intentó aunque fracasara, pero de ahí a responsabilizarlos por el inicio de la guerra... pues mientras más lo pienso más desproporcionado me parece.