"Victorias frustradas" de Erich Von Manstein.

[bycicleto]

¿Alguien sería tan amable de poner una imagen de la portada con la que el libro de las memorias de von Manstein va a salir al mercado?
Nunca se sabe lo útil que puede ser tener una idea de la portada, puede ser la diferencia entre pasar por un escaparate sin enterarse o llevartelo al estante.

Un saludo.

[ignasi]

La verdad es que sí, son una gran noticia. Supongo que en cierto modo seran equiparables a las del Grssadmiral Dönitz.

Ignasi

[Erich Hartmann]

Bueno, pues yo ya soy un orgulloso poseedor de la edición española de las Victorias Frustradas. Creo que van a volar de las librerías.

José Luis, respecto a la parte de Ztadelle de la que se habó anteriormente, he de decir que la edición española cuenta con un capítulo bastante más extenso al respecto; la verdad es que el capítulo de la versión inglesa (por lo menos el de la versión electrónica que yo tengo) es irrisiorio. El capítulo de la versión española tiene 40 páginas, distribuidas bajo los siguientes subapartados:

La situación estratégica en febrero de 1943. — ¿Era asequible todavía una solución de compromiso? — Posibilidades operativas soviéticas. — ¿Tomar la iniciativa en el ataque, o esperar a que se adelantase el enemigo? — Plan “ciudadela”. — Planteamiento de la operación. — Un aplazamiento fatal. — La conferencia en Munich. — El coronel general Model. — Nuevo aplazamiento hasta primeros de julio. — Cambio de impresiones entre el Grupo de Ejércitos y el Alto Mando del Ejército. —¿Por qué no desaconsejamos la ofensiva tardía? — Alocución de Hitler el 1º de julio. — El ataque. — El Noveno Ejército se queda atascado. — Los soviéticos atacan la curva de Orel. — En el Grupo de Ejércitos Sur la suerte del combate está en un hilo. — El 13 de julio ordena Hitler suspender el ataque. — Propósitos del Grupo de Ejércitos Sur. — Consideración final.

De momento no he leído el capítulo, pero vamos, es algo significativamente mejor que esto, que lo que yo tengo sobre Zitadelle de la versión inglesa:

14
OPERATION 'CITADEL'

THE PRECEDING chapter has shown that the winter campaign of 1942-3, which had startcd with the Russian breakthrough on the Don and Volga on both sides of Stalingrad, did not ultimately bring the Soviet command the decisive operational success for which it might have hoped.

The question now was how the German side should continue the struggle the following summer. Obviously, after so many major formations had been lost, there would no longer be the forces available to mount another crucial offensive on the scale of 1941 and 1942. What did still seem possible - given proper leadership on the German side — was that the Soviet Union could be worn down to such an extent that it would tire of its already excessive sacrifices and be ready to accept a stalemate. At the time in question this was far from being wishful thinking. On the other hand, such an aim could not be realized by going over to purely defensive, static warfare. For one thing, there were not enough German divisions to defend the far-flung front from the Baltic to the Black Sea decisively. For another, it was unlikely that the Soviets would take any action until the Western Allies landed in Europe - the danger of which had become all the more acute in the light of recent events in North Africa.

The German command thus had very little time left in which to force a draw in the east. It could only do so if it succeeded, within the framework of a - now inevitable - strategic defensive, in dealing the enemy powerful blows of a localized character which would sap his strength to a decisive degree - first and foremost through losses in prisoners. This pre-supposed an operational elasticity on our part which would give maximum effect to the still-superior quality of the German command staffs and fighting troops.

We naturally had to consider what action the Soviet command would take once the muddy season was over. Would Stalin wait until his allies had met his repeated demands for a landing on the European mainland? Though it seemed very natural that he should do so, there were still many arguments against it. Soviet self-confidence had undoubtedly increased since the big successes late in the previous autumn. Could the Soviet leaders possibly afford, from a psychological point of view, to call a halt to their loudly advertised 'liberation of the holy soil of Russia' ? Must the Kremlin not be anxious to beat its allies to the Balkans, the traditional target of Russian expansionism?

Assuming that the enemy resumed the offensive as soon as he had made good his losses, therefore, it seemed certain that he would continue to direct the main pressure of his attacks against the southern wing of the German front, i.e. against Southern Army Group.

The bulge in the German front, which ran down the Donetz and Mius from a point below Kharkov, embracing the valuable coal-mining and industrial region south of that city, was just begging to be sliced off. Should the enemy succeed in breaking through around Kharkov or even across the Middle Donetz, he could still achieve his aim of the previous winter and destroy the German southern wing on the Black Sea coast. (At this time Army Group A was still in the Kuban bridgehead!) By the same stroke he would regain possession of the precious Donetz area and the granaries of the Ukraine, in addition to opening the way to the Balkans and Rumanian oilfields, with all the political consequences this would have entailed in regard to Turkey. In no other sector of the Eastern Front was the Soviet Union offered such immense opportunities in the military, economic or political fields. The decisive thrust, then, would be delivered against Southern Army Group - a fact which, in view of the Russians' numerical superiority, naturally did not exclude the possibility of smaller-scale offensives in other parts of the front.

Southern Army Group had on a number of occasions brought these considerations to the notice of O.K.H. and Hitler. What the latter ultimately had to decide was whether the overall situation allowed us to wait for the Russians to start an offensive and then to hit them hard 'on the backhand' at the first good opportunity, or whether we should attack as early as possible ourselves and — still within the framework of a strategic defensive- strike a limited blow 'on the forehand'.

The Army Group preferred the former solution as one offering better prospects operationally, and had already submitted a tentative plan to Hitler in February. It envisaged that if the Russians did as we anticipated and launched a pincer attack on the Donetz area from the north and south - an operation which could sooner or later be supplemented by an offensive around Kharkov - our arc of front along the Donetz and Mius should be given up in accordance with an agreed time-table in order to draw the enemy westwards towards the Lower Dnieper. Simultaneously all the reserves that could possibly be released — in particular the bulk of the armour — were to assemble in the area west of Kharkov, first to smash the enemy assault forces which we expected to find there and then to drive into the flank of those advancing in the direction of the Lower Dnieper. In this way the enemy would be doomed to suffer the same fate on the coast of the Sea of Azov as he had in store for us on the Black Sea.

The plan did not meet with Hitler's approval, however. He was still pre-occupied with the economic aspects of the Donetz basin and apprehensive about the possible repercussions of an even temporary evacuation on the attitudes of Turkey and Rumania. But what probably did most to prejudice him was his belief that we must fight for every foot of the ground he had won from Stalin in the winter of 1941 and which had in his view 'saved the German Army from a Napoleonic retreat'. Besides this, however, he undoubtedly shrank from the risks which the proposed operation would assuredly entail. Inwardly, perhaps, he did not trust himself to cope with them, for in spite of having a certain eye for tactics, he still lacked the ability of a great captain.

Consequently our minds now turned to the idea of a 'forehand' stroke. An attempt must be made to strike the enemy a blow of limited scope before he could recover from his losses in the winter campaign and resuscitate his beaten forces.

A suitable target was presented by the Soviet salient which protruded far into our own front line around the city of Kursk. The Russians facing the boundary between Central and Southern Army Groups had been able to retain this when the muddy season set in, and it now formed a jumping-off position for any attacks they might be contemplating against the flanks of the two German army groups. The appreciable Soviet forces inside the salient would be cut off if our attack were successful, and provided that we launched it early enough we could hope to catch them in a state of unpreparedness. In particular, the enemy would have to commit the armoured units which had been so severely battered towards the end of the winter campaign, thereby giving us a chance to punish them wholesale.

And so we come to Operation 'Citadel' - the last major offensive operation undertaken by the Germans in the east. For this attack against the Kursk bulge, Southern Army Group provided two armies, Fourth Panzer and Detachment Kempf, comprising eleven armoured or panzer grenadier divisions and five infantry. In order to do so, of course, it had to thin out the Donetz and Mius fronts considerably.

For the attack from the north, Central Army Group provided Ninth Army, consisting of six armoured or panzer grenadier divisions and five infantry. The principal danger here lay in the army's having to assemble in the salient jutting out to the east around Orel, where the enemy might attack it in the rear from the east and north.

Operation 'Citadel' was timed to start in the first half of May, when the ground could be expected to have dried out sufficiently and the enemy would still not have finished refitting - especially his armour.

At the beginning of May, however, Hitler decided - against the advice of the two army group commanders - to postpone 'Citadel' till June, by which time, he hoped, our armoured divisions would be stronger still after being fitted out with new tanks. He stuck to his decision even after it had been pointed out to him that the unfavourable developments in Tunisia could mean that if 'Citadel' were put off any longer, there would be a danger of its coinciding with an enemy landing on the Continent. Nor would he recognize that the longer one waited, the more armour the Russians would have - particularly as their tank output undoubtedly exceeded that of Germany. As a result of delays in the delivery of our own new tanks, the Army Group was not ultimately able to move off on 'Citadel' until the beginning of July, by which time the essential advantage of a 'forehand' blow was lost. The whole idea had been to attack before the enemy had replenished his forces and got over the reverses of the winter. At the same time it was certain that the longer we took to launch the operation, the greater must be the threat to those of Southern Army Group's armies in the Donetz-Mius salient which had had to hand over all their available forces and, most of all, to the Orel bulge as the jumping-off base of Central Army Group's Ninth Army.

On 5th July the German armies were finally able to attack. Though every deception and camouflage measure had been taken, we could no longer expect to catch the enemy unawares after a delay of that length.

On the assault front of Central Army Group, Ninth Army succeeded in penetrating the enemy fortifications to a depth of about 9 miles in the first two days. After heavy fighting in which it had to beat off counter-attacks by enemy reserves, it managed to deepen this penetration by a few more miles up till 9th July, but then it came to a halt before a built-in system of positions on a dominant height to the rear of the front. Its intention of resuming the attack in a few days' time was frustrated by the enemy, who attacked the Orel bulge in strength from the north and north-east on nth July. To support Second Panzer Army in holding this front, the Army Group found itself compelled to throw strong mobile forces from Ninth Army into the Orel battle.

The offensive in Southern Army Group's area developed more favourably. Here, too, the attack through the enemy's deeply echeloned defences proved difficult enough and made only slow progress. However, by nth July it had been possible to break through the last position into the area of Prokhorovka and Oboyan. During this time hasty counter-attacks by the enemy's mobile reserves were beaten off, in the course of which ten tank or mechanized corps were either smashed or severely battered. By 13th July the enemy facing Southern Army Group had lost 24,000 men as prisoners, 1,800 tanks, 267 field-pieces and 1,080 anti-tank guns.

On 13th July, when the battle was at its climax and the issue apparently at hand, the commanders of the two army groups concerned were summoned to Hitler. He opened the conference by announcing that the Western Allies had landed in Sicily that day and that the situation there had taken an extremely serious turn. The Italians were not even attempting to fight, and the island was likely to be lost. Since the next step might well be a landing in the Balkans or Lower Italy, it was necessary to form new armies in Italy and the western Balkans. These forces must be found from the Eastern Front, so 'Citadel' would have to be discontinued.

Thus the very thing had come to pass of which I had warned Hitler in May.

The commander of Central Army Group, Field-Marshal v. Kluge, reported that Ninth Army was making no further headway and that he was having to deprive it of all its mobile forces to check the enemy's deep incursions into the Orel salient. There could be no question of continuing with 'Citadel' or of resuming the operation at a later date.

Speaking for my own Army Group, I pointed out that the battle was now at its culminating point, and that to break it off at this moment would be tantamount to throwing a victory away. On no account should we let go of the enemy until the mobile reserves he had committed were completely beaten.

Nonetheless, Hitler ruled that 'Citadel' was to be called off on account of the situation in the Mediterranean and the state of affairs in Central Army Group. The only concession he would make was that Southern Army Group should continue the attack until it had achieved its aim of smashing the enemy's armoured reserves. As a matter of fact not even this could be accomplished, for only a few days later the Army Group was ordered to hand over several armoured divisions to Central Army Group. The assault groups of both formations had to be withdrawn to their original start-lines.

And so the last German offensive in the east ended in a fiasco, even though the enemy opposite the two attacking armies of Southern Army Group had suffered four times their losses in prisoners, dead and wounded.

Saludos cordiales

[Ignatius 56]

Erich, Agradecería comentaras donde has comprado Batallas frustradas, pues yo lo estoy buscando por Barcelona o alrededores y no hay manera de encontrarlo, incluso envié ya hace dias un mail a la librería Europa, y aún espero contestación.
Saludos.

[Von Salza]

Amigo Arsac... no me extraña que no lo encuentres... el libro se llama "VICTORIAS frustradas" no "Batallas", por eso no has dado con él todavía (es broma)

Ahora en serio, yo lo he visto en la FNAC de La Illa (habían 3 ejemplares). Yo estoy juntando el dinero y me temo que me lo vas a arrebatar tú.

Un saludo.

[hawat]

El otro día tuve ocasión de hojear el libro en cuestión, y la verdad es que han hecho más bien poco para actualizar la edición original. Los mapas han sido recolocados más bien chapuceramente, de la versión original del 56, de una forma mas o menos ilegible.

Hoy en día se hubieran agradecido unos bueno mapas en láminas a color, que ayudasen a seguir el texto, que con lo que cuesta el dichoso ejemplar ya se podían tomar la molestia de realizar.

[Ignatius 56]

Amigo Arsac... no me extraña que no lo encuentres... el libro se llama "VICTORIAS frustradas" no "Batallas", por eso no has dado con él todavía (es broma)

Ahora en serio, yo lo he visto en la FNAC de La Illa (habían 3 ejemplares). Yo estoy juntando el dinero y me temo que me lo vas a arrebatar tú.

Un saludo.

Apreciado Von Salza.
Tienes toda la razón, se que se titula Victorias frustradas, lo de batallas, fue un lapsus, en fin me traicionó el subconsciente, como se dice a veces.
Bueno te dejo que me quites el ejemplar de FNAC, pero ten en cuenta que lo has de ir a buscar a la Illa, pues en el Triangle, todavía no les había llegado a dia de ayer (Sabado 02/12), pero compañero... donde si lo encontré es en el Corte Ingles del Portal del Angel, el último, pero me dijeron que estaban esperando otros 15, venga animos. bueno ya os comentaré cuando lo lea la impresión que me produce.
Saludos.

[Sori]

Ya me hize con un ejemplar. Por fin han llegado a Bilbao; aunque de momento solo en TopBooks; ni en la casa del libro ni en el corte ingles lo tenian.
Ahora a disfrutar de el


Saludos

[jpuente]

Ya también me lo he comprado. A ver que tal está.

Saludos

[Erwin Rommel]

Yo lo he comprado en www.casadelibro.com a 29 euros. Un saludo

[JOSE ANTONIO AZURZA]

Perdona Sori:Yo tambien soy de Bilbao,¿Quedaban mas ejemplares?.Un saludo.

[Erwin Rommel]

Perdon, ya se que no viene al caso, ni es tema del foro, pero ante tanto bilbaino, solo puedo decir: "Aupa Athletic Txapeldun"
Perdon por la licencia camaradas foreros

[JOSE ANTONIO AZURZA]

¡Gora atlhetic beti!Yo tambien pido perdon,pero a esto no puedo resistirme.Un saludo.

[Sori]

Jejejejejeje. Ha estado bien aunque el futbol no es mi fuerte.

En cuanto al libro si quedan un par de ejemplares. Estan en la planta de arriba un tanto escondidos. Lo mejor es que preguntes a las libreras ellas te lo daran.


Saludos

[V.Manstein]

Se me ha facilitado una copia de la versión española del Verlorene Siege de Inédita y creo que me veré obligado a enviar una queja al editor......lamentablemente no se ha incluido ni una foto del autor ni un perfil biográfico completo y adecuado como sería de justicia para conocimiento de los lectores no expertos en el conflicto.