El sol del desierto
Moderador: Antonio
El sol del desierto
Hay algo que me ronda la cabeza desde hace tiempo, sobre los soldados que luchaban el en desierto: ¿Como les afectaba la luz solar intensa?
Quiero decir; siendo las tropas inglesas y alemanas, nacionalidades en las que la melanina suele brillar por su ausencia; ¿Eran abundantes los casos de melanoma? ¿Se suminstraban cremas protectoras y demás productos protectores a la tropa?
Despues de ver a los sufridos turistas del norte en nuestras playas, quemándose cual salchicha al fuego, es una pregunta que me suele acudir a la cabeza.
Quiero decir; siendo las tropas inglesas y alemanas, nacionalidades en las que la melanina suele brillar por su ausencia; ¿Eran abundantes los casos de melanoma? ¿Se suminstraban cremas protectoras y demás productos protectores a la tropa?
Despues de ver a los sufridos turistas del norte en nuestras playas, quemándose cual salchicha al fuego, es una pregunta que me suele acudir a la cabeza.
"Hubo un tiempo, no hace mucho, en el que le dimos a este mundo una guerra con la que jamás había soñado..."
¡Hola, Hawat!
Me vas a permitir que te extraiga un par de textos de la obra de Toppe (Desert Warfare: German Experiences in World War II) sobre el tema de tu interés, y que lo haga en su original en inglés. Espero que te sirva
Acclimatization of the Troops
So far as the first divisions transferred to Africa were concerned,
no measures were taken to accustom the troops to excessive
heat. Some of the repIacements sent forward later had the
opportunity of spending a certain period in southern Italy or in
the Balkans for acclimatization. The climate in these two regions
is very similar to the climate in the coastal areas of North
Africa. In the light of experience, however, a familiarization
period is not considered absolutely essential, since the troops
employed without a prior period of acclimatization proved no
less efficient in combat than those who had lived for a time in
southern Italy or in the Balkans. It was not the climate alone
that caused the heavy losses that were suffered but the poor
food, the hardships during combat, combined with the effects
of the climate; the troops had in no way been prepared for these
circumstances.
It proved very unwise to transfer units or replacements to
the desert in summer, during the hottest part of the year and
the time when the flies proved most troublesome. A parachute
brigade provides a typical example. The brigade was transferred
from Europe in July 1942, the hottest time of the year, and
employed in defense in the rocky wilderness around El Alamein.
The unit consisted of handpicked men, and within a very short
while, more than 50 percent of them were sick from the combined
effects of the heat, with its accompanying discomforts,
and the inadequate diet. Shortly after the unit was committed,
numerous cases of metabolic disorders set in, such as dysentery,
jaundice, and festering sores that healed only very slowly. The
causes were the brackish drinking water, which contained as
much as one gram of salt per liter, and the inadequate diet,
which consisted almost exclusively of canned foods. Blond and
redheaded men with blue eyes and fair skins were particularly
susceptible, while the brown and dark-haired types soon recovered
from the disorders that were almost inevitable in the
beginning. These points were not taken into account in earlier
medical examinations-the main emphasis being placed on sound
teeth and a strong heart. The result was that the elite units,
such as the paratroopers, suffered particularly heavy losses. Even
prior acclimatization would not have protected them.
The following experience was gained in respect to the acclimatization
of persons to hot climates: men who had lived before
in temperate zones stood the intense heat very well in the first
year, during which they were far more efficient than the indigenous
population and Europeans who had been living in the country for a long time. This proved to be the case when German
troops were employed in Sicily, for instance, where summer
temperatures are the same as those in the deserts of Africa. In
the average case, however, the powers of resistance of the new
arrivals declined after the first year, and their efficiency sank
below the level of that of persons who had spent a longer time
in the country. The newcomers’ efficiency only started to improve
gradually after a few years but never reached the same standard
as that they experienced the first year. The following inferences
can be drawn from this experience:
(1) No prior, lengthy acclimatization should take place
for troops, since this would waste part of their first year of
maximum efficiency.
(2) Only a brief transitional period should be allowed in
a hot climate, during which the troops can be instructed in the
manner of living under tropical and desert conditions and the
best protective measures they should take without the added
difficulty of enemy action.
(3) After approximately one year on active service in a
hot climate, the troops should be rotated to some other theater
of operations. The disadvantage that the experience gained by
the men can only be exploited for a relatively short time must
be accepted.
Heat
a. General
Even the very high temperatures during the hot seasons of
the year failed to impair the efficiency of the German troops to
any noticeable extent. This is shown particularly well by
Rommel’s summer offensive from May to July 1942. The achievements
of the troops refuted the former opinion of the Italians
that European troops could not stand up under high temperatures.
Even the British showed no regard for the heat; they
attacked at Sollum in June 1941 and were planning a new offensive
for June 1942. The most important thing for standing up
successfully under hardships of this kind is the toughness of
the troops and the good examples set by their leaders of all
ranks, who as a matter of course should share all deprivations
with their subordinates.
Experience has shown that men under thirty-five are best
able to adapt themselves to a hot climate. Acclimatization is
easier in the open country than in cities.
b. Effect on Unaccustomed Troops
Newly arrived units had low fighting power and many losses
through sickness, The heat paralyzed the men’s willpower and
thus also their powers of resistance. The diseases themselves
were probably more a direct result of the soldiers’ diets (bad
water, canned food) and hardships than of the heat. The sudden temperature drop in the evenings, causing abdominal colds, was
also an important element.
c. Effect on Tank Crews
In tanks, the effects of heat-measuring 45 degrees on the
gyrostatic thermometer (113 degrees Fahrenheit)-was naturally
much greater on the men than among other troops. The heat
became unendurable for men in combat, when the hatches had
to be closed because of artillery fire and when the engines and
ventilating systems had to be shut off during pauses in the
action because of the lack of fuel. Nevertheless, the German
tank crews held out under even these temperatures.
d. Measures Taken to Avoid the Noonday Heat
In combat, it was generahy impossible to make any ahowantes
for even the greatest heat. During quiet periods in position
warfare, however, there was always a noonday rest period of at
least three hours. Cold rations were issued to the troops at noon
and hot rations at night.
e. Special Equipment for Protection Against Temperature
Variations
Measures were taken against temperature variations by
requiring warm clothing and bellybands to be worn after sundown.
Each soldier had three blankets, one of which had to
serve as a ground sheet for protection against the night dampness.
For wounded men, four blankets were required (two for
covering the men and two for placing underneath them).
f. Types of Shelter
In combat, the troops had no shelter whatsoever. They either
spent the night in their position or else in or underneath their
vehicles.
Wall tents for four men, with a double top awning, were used
chiefly as shelter. They proved thoroughly useful and met all
the requirements of desert warfare. At the beginning of the
campaign, low one-man tents, likewise provided with an awning,
were issued, but later there was not a sufficient number of them
available. There were also larger tents for ten or twelve men.
However, these could be used for the most part only in rear
areas, since it was practically impossible to camouflage them.
The Italian field hospital tents also proved highly successful.
g. Camparisan Betweelz the Efficiency of Troops in the
Tropics and in Temperate Climates
After the men had become accustomed to desert warfare and
after those who could not adapt themselves to it had been eliminated, the efficiency of the troops in combat operations was not
inferior to that of troops serving in temperate climates. Even
the drivers achieved normal efficiency, since the wind stream
while driving cooled them off and refreshed them. In all kinds
of physical labor, on the other hand, the heat greatly reduced
efficiency. In this respect, the Italian troops were superior to
the Germans. For this reason, they did most of the road construction
work and mine laying. The detour road around Tobruk,
for example, was built by Italian labor units. It constituted an
outstanding achievement that German troops could not have
accomplished in the same time.
h. Effect on Materiel and Equipment
The heat had no effect on guns, because they became so
heated during firing that this more or less neutralized the outside
temperature. No damage to war materiel and items of
equipment was reported or was to be expected.
i. Effect on Visibility
In the interior of the desert about ten kilometers from the
coast, the vibration of the air makes accurate observation practically
impossible for a distance of more than one kilometer.
All objects at a distance of one kilometer and more appear to
move, and it is scarcely possible to decide whether a dark spot
on the horizon is an approaching motor vehicle or a destroyed
vehicle. At still greater distances, all contours become so blurred
that one always thinks that one is surrounded by a sheet of
water, from which certain elevations stand out as “islands.” In
the beginning of the war in the desert, during the first attack
on Cyrenaica, several units fell victim to this deception. They
tried to drive around what they thought was a “lake” and therefore
did not reach their appointed objectives, On the other hand,
the vibration of the air protected small detachments in the
desert from being discovered by the enemy from the ground.
Surveying work suffered to an extraordinary extent from the
vibration. It was only in the morning hours (until around 1000)
that satisfactory work could be done with aiming circles or
theodolites.
j. Effect on Airplanes in Taking Off and Landing
For the Luftwaffe, great heat often had a considerable effect
on takeoffs and landings. The density of the air was so reduced
that the lengths of takeoffs and lengths of landing strips had
to be increased by as much as 50 percent. Landing operations
could be indirectly disturbed by strong air reflections in the
heated ground layer, thus causing errors in the estimation of
altitude.
If airplanes stand for a long time in strong sunlight, the
polished metal parts in the cabin, especially the glassed-in cockpit,
become so hot that they cannot be touched. Therefore, the
cabins have to be covered with tarpaulins. For the same reason,
strong sunlight entering the cabin during flight is also disagreeable
for the pilots. Curtains relieved this difficulty but
hampered visibility.
Saludos cordiales
José Luis
Me vas a permitir que te extraiga un par de textos de la obra de Toppe (Desert Warfare: German Experiences in World War II) sobre el tema de tu interés, y que lo haga en su original en inglés. Espero que te sirva
Acclimatization of the Troops
So far as the first divisions transferred to Africa were concerned,
no measures were taken to accustom the troops to excessive
heat. Some of the repIacements sent forward later had the
opportunity of spending a certain period in southern Italy or in
the Balkans for acclimatization. The climate in these two regions
is very similar to the climate in the coastal areas of North
Africa. In the light of experience, however, a familiarization
period is not considered absolutely essential, since the troops
employed without a prior period of acclimatization proved no
less efficient in combat than those who had lived for a time in
southern Italy or in the Balkans. It was not the climate alone
that caused the heavy losses that were suffered but the poor
food, the hardships during combat, combined with the effects
of the climate; the troops had in no way been prepared for these
circumstances.
It proved very unwise to transfer units or replacements to
the desert in summer, during the hottest part of the year and
the time when the flies proved most troublesome. A parachute
brigade provides a typical example. The brigade was transferred
from Europe in July 1942, the hottest time of the year, and
employed in defense in the rocky wilderness around El Alamein.
The unit consisted of handpicked men, and within a very short
while, more than 50 percent of them were sick from the combined
effects of the heat, with its accompanying discomforts,
and the inadequate diet. Shortly after the unit was committed,
numerous cases of metabolic disorders set in, such as dysentery,
jaundice, and festering sores that healed only very slowly. The
causes were the brackish drinking water, which contained as
much as one gram of salt per liter, and the inadequate diet,
which consisted almost exclusively of canned foods. Blond and
redheaded men with blue eyes and fair skins were particularly
susceptible, while the brown and dark-haired types soon recovered
from the disorders that were almost inevitable in the
beginning. These points were not taken into account in earlier
medical examinations-the main emphasis being placed on sound
teeth and a strong heart. The result was that the elite units,
such as the paratroopers, suffered particularly heavy losses. Even
prior acclimatization would not have protected them.
The following experience was gained in respect to the acclimatization
of persons to hot climates: men who had lived before
in temperate zones stood the intense heat very well in the first
year, during which they were far more efficient than the indigenous
population and Europeans who had been living in the country for a long time. This proved to be the case when German
troops were employed in Sicily, for instance, where summer
temperatures are the same as those in the deserts of Africa. In
the average case, however, the powers of resistance of the new
arrivals declined after the first year, and their efficiency sank
below the level of that of persons who had spent a longer time
in the country. The newcomers’ efficiency only started to improve
gradually after a few years but never reached the same standard
as that they experienced the first year. The following inferences
can be drawn from this experience:
(1) No prior, lengthy acclimatization should take place
for troops, since this would waste part of their first year of
maximum efficiency.
(2) Only a brief transitional period should be allowed in
a hot climate, during which the troops can be instructed in the
manner of living under tropical and desert conditions and the
best protective measures they should take without the added
difficulty of enemy action.
(3) After approximately one year on active service in a
hot climate, the troops should be rotated to some other theater
of operations. The disadvantage that the experience gained by
the men can only be exploited for a relatively short time must
be accepted.
Heat
a. General
Even the very high temperatures during the hot seasons of
the year failed to impair the efficiency of the German troops to
any noticeable extent. This is shown particularly well by
Rommel’s summer offensive from May to July 1942. The achievements
of the troops refuted the former opinion of the Italians
that European troops could not stand up under high temperatures.
Even the British showed no regard for the heat; they
attacked at Sollum in June 1941 and were planning a new offensive
for June 1942. The most important thing for standing up
successfully under hardships of this kind is the toughness of
the troops and the good examples set by their leaders of all
ranks, who as a matter of course should share all deprivations
with their subordinates.
Experience has shown that men under thirty-five are best
able to adapt themselves to a hot climate. Acclimatization is
easier in the open country than in cities.
b. Effect on Unaccustomed Troops
Newly arrived units had low fighting power and many losses
through sickness, The heat paralyzed the men’s willpower and
thus also their powers of resistance. The diseases themselves
were probably more a direct result of the soldiers’ diets (bad
water, canned food) and hardships than of the heat. The sudden temperature drop in the evenings, causing abdominal colds, was
also an important element.
c. Effect on Tank Crews
In tanks, the effects of heat-measuring 45 degrees on the
gyrostatic thermometer (113 degrees Fahrenheit)-was naturally
much greater on the men than among other troops. The heat
became unendurable for men in combat, when the hatches had
to be closed because of artillery fire and when the engines and
ventilating systems had to be shut off during pauses in the
action because of the lack of fuel. Nevertheless, the German
tank crews held out under even these temperatures.
d. Measures Taken to Avoid the Noonday Heat
In combat, it was generahy impossible to make any ahowantes
for even the greatest heat. During quiet periods in position
warfare, however, there was always a noonday rest period of at
least three hours. Cold rations were issued to the troops at noon
and hot rations at night.
e. Special Equipment for Protection Against Temperature
Variations
Measures were taken against temperature variations by
requiring warm clothing and bellybands to be worn after sundown.
Each soldier had three blankets, one of which had to
serve as a ground sheet for protection against the night dampness.
For wounded men, four blankets were required (two for
covering the men and two for placing underneath them).
f. Types of Shelter
In combat, the troops had no shelter whatsoever. They either
spent the night in their position or else in or underneath their
vehicles.
Wall tents for four men, with a double top awning, were used
chiefly as shelter. They proved thoroughly useful and met all
the requirements of desert warfare. At the beginning of the
campaign, low one-man tents, likewise provided with an awning,
were issued, but later there was not a sufficient number of them
available. There were also larger tents for ten or twelve men.
However, these could be used for the most part only in rear
areas, since it was practically impossible to camouflage them.
The Italian field hospital tents also proved highly successful.
g. Camparisan Betweelz the Efficiency of Troops in the
Tropics and in Temperate Climates
After the men had become accustomed to desert warfare and
after those who could not adapt themselves to it had been eliminated, the efficiency of the troops in combat operations was not
inferior to that of troops serving in temperate climates. Even
the drivers achieved normal efficiency, since the wind stream
while driving cooled them off and refreshed them. In all kinds
of physical labor, on the other hand, the heat greatly reduced
efficiency. In this respect, the Italian troops were superior to
the Germans. For this reason, they did most of the road construction
work and mine laying. The detour road around Tobruk,
for example, was built by Italian labor units. It constituted an
outstanding achievement that German troops could not have
accomplished in the same time.
h. Effect on Materiel and Equipment
The heat had no effect on guns, because they became so
heated during firing that this more or less neutralized the outside
temperature. No damage to war materiel and items of
equipment was reported or was to be expected.
i. Effect on Visibility
In the interior of the desert about ten kilometers from the
coast, the vibration of the air makes accurate observation practically
impossible for a distance of more than one kilometer.
All objects at a distance of one kilometer and more appear to
move, and it is scarcely possible to decide whether a dark spot
on the horizon is an approaching motor vehicle or a destroyed
vehicle. At still greater distances, all contours become so blurred
that one always thinks that one is surrounded by a sheet of
water, from which certain elevations stand out as “islands.” In
the beginning of the war in the desert, during the first attack
on Cyrenaica, several units fell victim to this deception. They
tried to drive around what they thought was a “lake” and therefore
did not reach their appointed objectives, On the other hand,
the vibration of the air protected small detachments in the
desert from being discovered by the enemy from the ground.
Surveying work suffered to an extraordinary extent from the
vibration. It was only in the morning hours (until around 1000)
that satisfactory work could be done with aiming circles or
theodolites.
j. Effect on Airplanes in Taking Off and Landing
For the Luftwaffe, great heat often had a considerable effect
on takeoffs and landings. The density of the air was so reduced
that the lengths of takeoffs and lengths of landing strips had
to be increased by as much as 50 percent. Landing operations
could be indirectly disturbed by strong air reflections in the
heated ground layer, thus causing errors in the estimation of
altitude.
If airplanes stand for a long time in strong sunlight, the
polished metal parts in the cabin, especially the glassed-in cockpit,
become so hot that they cannot be touched. Therefore, the
cabins have to be covered with tarpaulins. For the same reason,
strong sunlight entering the cabin during flight is also disagreeable
for the pilots. Curtains relieved this difficulty but
hampered visibility.
Saludos cordiales
José Luis
"Dioses, no me juzguéis como un dios
sino como un hombre
a quien ha destrozado el mar" (Plegaria fenicia)
sino como un hombre
a quien ha destrozado el mar" (Plegaria fenicia)
Muchas gracias, Jluis, el texto es excelente y muy completo.
Por lo que veo, la doctrina oficial venía a ser: allá os las compongáis. Cosa que tampoco me extraña mucho, dado lo lejano del campo de batalla y lo precarios d elas condicones en la época.
Y pensando en los inviernos rusos, el desierto tampoco estaba tan mal...![Wink :wink:](./images/smilies/icon_wink.gif)
Por lo que veo, la doctrina oficial venía a ser: allá os las compongáis. Cosa que tampoco me extraña mucho, dado lo lejano del campo de batalla y lo precarios d elas condicones en la época.
Y pensando en los inviernos rusos, el desierto tampoco estaba tan mal...
![Wink :wink:](./images/smilies/icon_wink.gif)
"Hubo un tiempo, no hace mucho, en el que le dimos a este mundo una guerra con la que jamás había soñado..."
¡Buenos días a todos!
Estimado Hawat,
Sin experiencia previa de combate no puede haber ni teoría ni doctrina, y la experiencia alemana de preguerra en el teatro africano era prácticamente nula, con la sola excepción de su experiencia de la IGM en sus colonias africanas. Sólo en 1935 se creó un departamento para asuntos coloniales en la Oficina de Asuntos Exteriores del Ministerio de la Guerra del Tercer Reich. El departamento contaba exclusivamente con un único oficial que había combatido en el sudoeste del África alemana.
Así que antes de estallar la guerra en 1939, la Wehrmacht no había preparado ningún tipo de planificación ni tenía ningún conocimiento geográfico para una posible, aunque improbable, participación en una guerra en el norte de África. En 1938, el Departamento de Inspección y Trazado de Mapas del Estado Mayor General del Heer había sugerido que los mapas que se emitieran para una eventual movilización debían incluir mapas de Dinamarca, Noruega y África del Norte, pero la propuesta fue rechazada por el jefe del Departamento Operativo por considerarla completamente innecesaria. Así se puede entender que cuando Hitler le encargó la realización de un plan de ataque sobre Escandinavia al general von Falkenhorst, éste, ante la falta de mapas, tuviera que comprarse una guía de Noruega para elaborar el proyecto.
Hasta el verano de 1940 la información disponible para el OKH se reducía a los informes suministrados por el agregado militar alemán en Roma (que provenían en su mayoría del oficial de enlace asignado al gobernador general, esto es, al comandante en jefe de las fuerzas italianas en África del Norte) y a los informes del servicio de contra-inteligencia alemán. A partir del otoño de 1940, se estableció en Libia el Destacamento Especial Dora, del servicio de contra-inteligencia alemán, cuya misión principal era controlar los territorios franceses. Toda la información interesante de naturaleza militar se consiguió de los manuales del Departamento de Inteligencia de los Ejércitos Extranjeros (británicos, franceses e italianos).
Por ello cuando en febrero de 1941 comenzaron a llegar las primeras unidades del DAK a África, Rommel no tenía ni puñetera idea del teatro de operaciones en que iba a pasar los dos próximos años. Y la información que tenían los italianos, por increíble que parezca, en casi nada podía ayudar a llenar la laguna alemana. Así que el primer papel que tuvo Rommel en Libia fue procurarse por su cuenta la imprescindible información sobre las condiciones del terreno y la elaboración y desarrollo de mapas solventes. Él mismo lo cuenta:
“Probablemente nunca sucedió antes en una guerra modernas que una operación de este tipo fuera llevada con tan poca preparación. El 11 de febrero me presenté al general Garibaldi, el comandante en jefe de las fuerzas italianas, y le informé de mi misión. Inicialmente no mostró entusiasmo por mi plan para organizar las posiciones defensivas en la región de la bahía de Sirte como primera medida. Usando el deficiente e inseguro material de mapas italiano, procedí a explicar al general Garibaldi mis ideas sobre cómo se debería conducir la guerra en Tripolitania. Garibaldi, que fue incapaz de darme cualquier tipo de información precisa sobre el terreno afectado, me aconsejó reconocer personalmente el terreno entre Trípoli y la bahía de Sirte, y dijo que yo posiblemente no podía tener idea de las enormes dificultades que presentaba este teatro de la guerra. Hacia mediodía subí a bordo de un He-111 para reconocer el área de combate. Vimos las fortificaciones de campaña y las profundas cunetas antitanque al este de Trípoli, y luego volamos sobre un ancho cinturón de dunas que presentaba una buena barrera natural ante las fortificaciones de Trípoli y que sería difícil de atravesar con vehículos de rueda u oruga. Después volamos a través de la región montañosa entre Taruna y Homs, que parecía difícilmente apropiada para operaciones con unidades blindadas en contraste con el territorio entre Homs y Misurata”. Rommel sigue dando la relación de su reconocimiento y concluye: “Este vuelo de reconocimiento apoyó mi plan para fortificar Sirte y el terreno a ambos lados de la carretera de la costa, y concentrar las unidades móviles para operaciones móviles dentro del área del sector defensivo con la intención de contraatacar tan pronto el enemigo comenzara su ataque envolvente”.
Más tarde se le suministró a Rommel una información de escaso valor militar que procedía de trabajos literarios. Sólo cuando llegó a África la unidad geológica militar (2 geólogos y 10 auxiliares) asignada al DAK, comenzó ésta a desarrollar metódica y sistemáticamente el trabajo de reconocimiento. Los mapas ingleses capturados fueron de excepcional importancia. Cuando al final se reunió la información suficiente, los mapas elaborados contenían:
A.- El terreno que podía ser atravesado por cualquier tipo de vehículo en todas las partes y en todas las direcciones.
B.- El terreno de fuera de las pistas que era moderadamente o deficientemente adecuado para el tráfico de vehículos.
C.- El terreno con muchos acantilados abruptos.
D.- Marismas y depresiones que eran impracticables después de las lluvias.
E.- Dunas difíciles para el tráfico de vehículos.
F.- Información sobre plantas y su crecimiento
G.- Terreno abierto
H.- Acantilados impracticables
I.- Acantilados menos abruptos que eran practicables en numerosos lugares
J.- Pasos sobre acantilados, con información sobre si podían cruzarse con vehículos de ruedas u orugas.
K.- Lo mismo que el anterior para senderos.
Esta unidad, sin embargo, no tenía el equipo necesario, y sólo se pudo reunir información sobre las áreas que ocasionalmente tenían importancia táctica.
Saludos cordiales
José Luis
Estimado Hawat,
Sin experiencia previa de combate no puede haber ni teoría ni doctrina, y la experiencia alemana de preguerra en el teatro africano era prácticamente nula, con la sola excepción de su experiencia de la IGM en sus colonias africanas. Sólo en 1935 se creó un departamento para asuntos coloniales en la Oficina de Asuntos Exteriores del Ministerio de la Guerra del Tercer Reich. El departamento contaba exclusivamente con un único oficial que había combatido en el sudoeste del África alemana.
Así que antes de estallar la guerra en 1939, la Wehrmacht no había preparado ningún tipo de planificación ni tenía ningún conocimiento geográfico para una posible, aunque improbable, participación en una guerra en el norte de África. En 1938, el Departamento de Inspección y Trazado de Mapas del Estado Mayor General del Heer había sugerido que los mapas que se emitieran para una eventual movilización debían incluir mapas de Dinamarca, Noruega y África del Norte, pero la propuesta fue rechazada por el jefe del Departamento Operativo por considerarla completamente innecesaria. Así se puede entender que cuando Hitler le encargó la realización de un plan de ataque sobre Escandinavia al general von Falkenhorst, éste, ante la falta de mapas, tuviera que comprarse una guía de Noruega para elaborar el proyecto.
Hasta el verano de 1940 la información disponible para el OKH se reducía a los informes suministrados por el agregado militar alemán en Roma (que provenían en su mayoría del oficial de enlace asignado al gobernador general, esto es, al comandante en jefe de las fuerzas italianas en África del Norte) y a los informes del servicio de contra-inteligencia alemán. A partir del otoño de 1940, se estableció en Libia el Destacamento Especial Dora, del servicio de contra-inteligencia alemán, cuya misión principal era controlar los territorios franceses. Toda la información interesante de naturaleza militar se consiguió de los manuales del Departamento de Inteligencia de los Ejércitos Extranjeros (británicos, franceses e italianos).
Por ello cuando en febrero de 1941 comenzaron a llegar las primeras unidades del DAK a África, Rommel no tenía ni puñetera idea del teatro de operaciones en que iba a pasar los dos próximos años. Y la información que tenían los italianos, por increíble que parezca, en casi nada podía ayudar a llenar la laguna alemana. Así que el primer papel que tuvo Rommel en Libia fue procurarse por su cuenta la imprescindible información sobre las condiciones del terreno y la elaboración y desarrollo de mapas solventes. Él mismo lo cuenta:
“Probablemente nunca sucedió antes en una guerra modernas que una operación de este tipo fuera llevada con tan poca preparación. El 11 de febrero me presenté al general Garibaldi, el comandante en jefe de las fuerzas italianas, y le informé de mi misión. Inicialmente no mostró entusiasmo por mi plan para organizar las posiciones defensivas en la región de la bahía de Sirte como primera medida. Usando el deficiente e inseguro material de mapas italiano, procedí a explicar al general Garibaldi mis ideas sobre cómo se debería conducir la guerra en Tripolitania. Garibaldi, que fue incapaz de darme cualquier tipo de información precisa sobre el terreno afectado, me aconsejó reconocer personalmente el terreno entre Trípoli y la bahía de Sirte, y dijo que yo posiblemente no podía tener idea de las enormes dificultades que presentaba este teatro de la guerra. Hacia mediodía subí a bordo de un He-111 para reconocer el área de combate. Vimos las fortificaciones de campaña y las profundas cunetas antitanque al este de Trípoli, y luego volamos sobre un ancho cinturón de dunas que presentaba una buena barrera natural ante las fortificaciones de Trípoli y que sería difícil de atravesar con vehículos de rueda u oruga. Después volamos a través de la región montañosa entre Taruna y Homs, que parecía difícilmente apropiada para operaciones con unidades blindadas en contraste con el territorio entre Homs y Misurata”. Rommel sigue dando la relación de su reconocimiento y concluye: “Este vuelo de reconocimiento apoyó mi plan para fortificar Sirte y el terreno a ambos lados de la carretera de la costa, y concentrar las unidades móviles para operaciones móviles dentro del área del sector defensivo con la intención de contraatacar tan pronto el enemigo comenzara su ataque envolvente”.
Más tarde se le suministró a Rommel una información de escaso valor militar que procedía de trabajos literarios. Sólo cuando llegó a África la unidad geológica militar (2 geólogos y 10 auxiliares) asignada al DAK, comenzó ésta a desarrollar metódica y sistemáticamente el trabajo de reconocimiento. Los mapas ingleses capturados fueron de excepcional importancia. Cuando al final se reunió la información suficiente, los mapas elaborados contenían:
A.- El terreno que podía ser atravesado por cualquier tipo de vehículo en todas las partes y en todas las direcciones.
B.- El terreno de fuera de las pistas que era moderadamente o deficientemente adecuado para el tráfico de vehículos.
C.- El terreno con muchos acantilados abruptos.
D.- Marismas y depresiones que eran impracticables después de las lluvias.
E.- Dunas difíciles para el tráfico de vehículos.
F.- Información sobre plantas y su crecimiento
G.- Terreno abierto
H.- Acantilados impracticables
I.- Acantilados menos abruptos que eran practicables en numerosos lugares
J.- Pasos sobre acantilados, con información sobre si podían cruzarse con vehículos de ruedas u orugas.
K.- Lo mismo que el anterior para senderos.
Esta unidad, sin embargo, no tenía el equipo necesario, y sólo se pudo reunir información sobre las áreas que ocasionalmente tenían importancia táctica.
Saludos cordiales
José Luis
"Dioses, no me juzguéis como un dios
sino como un hombre
a quien ha destrozado el mar" (Plegaria fenicia)
sino como un hombre
a quien ha destrozado el mar" (Plegaria fenicia)
- Antonio
- Moderador
- Mensajes: 516
- Registrado: Lun Abr 17, 2006 4:21 am
- Ubicación: http://www.elasticparadise.com
- Contactar:
Mi padre (1. Rgt Articelere) no hubo alguna aclimatacion y pasò en el febrero del '41 desde la fria Italia a Libia. Unica proteccion gafas de sol y casque.
16 meses de sol africano, y 4 años màs de sol indiano como POW, al regreso en Italia no pudo màs ir al mar con nosotros hijos y mujer. El quiere la sombra !
Oasis
16 meses de sol africano, y 4 años màs de sol indiano como POW, al regreso en Italia no pudo màs ir al mar con nosotros hijos y mujer. El quiere la sombra !
Oasis
- Jorge Romo Perez
- Miembro
- Mensajes: 364
- Registrado: Jue Abr 27, 2006 2:15 am
- Ubicación: 52º 12' 24" N, 15º 06' 30" E
Oasis bienvenida tu aportaciòn y esperamos nos puedas proporcionar mas datos de tu Padre, y sus experiencias que son muy valiosos para nosotros. ![Very Happy :-D](./images/smilies/icon_biggrin.gif)
![Very Happy :-D](./images/smilies/icon_biggrin.gif)
"Cuando regreses a casa, dile a tus hijos, que a cambio de su futuro, ofrendamos nuestro presente".
John Maxwell Edmonds (1875 -1958) inscrito en el Kohima 2nd Division Memorial
![Imagen](http://i94.photobucket.com/albums/l95/hartmann_/50.gif)
John Maxwell Edmonds (1875 -1958) inscrito en el Kohima 2nd Division Memorial
![Imagen](http://i94.photobucket.com/albums/l95/hartmann_/50.gif)
El sol del desierto
Hola a todos, con respecto a lo improvisado de la llegada del DAK a este teatro de operaciones, basta con decir que la cocina de campaña que llevaron era a leña, y recien se dieron cuenta de lo escasa que era la madera en este lugar a su llegada, por lo que creo que se debe de haber improvisado tambien en otros muchos otros aspectos, como ser aclimatacion, cuidados por el sol, etc. Saludos.
- Hundi
- Miembro distinguido
- Mensajes: 4224
- Registrado: Dom Oct 18, 2009 10:36 pm
- Ubicación: Guatemala
- Contactar:
El sol del desierto
Si a todo eso le sumanos las tormentas de arena que hacen sus desmanes en la tropa y en la maquinaria...
La campaña de africa fue una pesadilla para los dos bandos.
La campaña de africa fue una pesadilla para los dos bandos.
[size=85]Hago de mi futuro una utopía, pues pretendo comprender, esta voluble vida...[/size]
[size=85][color=#FF0000]Una vida sin vicios es una vida sin virtudes.[/color][/size]
[size=85][color=#FF0000]Una vida sin vicios es una vida sin virtudes.[/color][/size]
-
- Usuario
- Mensajes: 3
- Registrado: Mié Ene 13, 2010 10:55 pm
El sol del desierto
si de algo hay que tener en cuenta es que los alemanes no estaban preparados ni fisica ni mentalmente para enfrentar el feroz sol africano y mucho menos al temible sahara ![Sad :(](./images/smilies/icon_sad.gif)
![Sad :(](./images/smilies/icon_sad.gif)
- culoconbotas
- Usuario
- Mensajes: 3
- Registrado: Vie Feb 26, 2010 10:26 pm
El sol del desierto
henry aybar escribió:si de algo hay que tener en cuenta es que los alemanes no estaban preparados ni fisica ni mentalmente para enfrentar el feroz sol africano y mucho menos al temible sahara
efectivamente,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,el famoso GHIBLI que en alguna ocasion obligó a Rommel a aterrizar el Storch de reconocimiento. esas tormentas de arena podian tirar un avion....el desierto es llevar al limite las cosas, al igual que el invierno ruso......Recuerdo un pasaje de Rommel en Rumania, cuando despues de combates se metieron en una iglesia para pasar una noche bajo cero y lloviendo. Llegó un destacamento de mayor graduacion y ocupó la citada iglesia, sacando al destacamento Rommel otra vez a la calle.............habla de que coger el sueño con la ropa empapada y un potente frio era mision imposible...............
- tudequieneres
- Usuario
- Mensajes: 10
- Registrado: Vie Jul 15, 2011 5:00 pm
El sol del desierto
Muy bueno el artículo en inglés. Hubiera agradecido incluso otro en alemán por parte de sus tropas pero está muy bien ya! Imagino a los pobres intentando luchar en esas zonas con la calda correspondiente...muy diferente de ponerse como gambar por ir allí de vacaciones, oder? Keine Frage!:D
Das war nur ein Vorspiel...
- Juan M. Parada C.
- Miembro distinguido
- Mensajes: 8156
- Registrado: Jue Ene 20, 2011 12:18 am
- Ubicación: Ejido-Estado Mérida-Venezuela.
Re: El sol del desierto
Estimados amigos: El sol del teatro noráfricano,a mi juicio,debió ser una pesadilla de pronóstico reservado.A diferencia de lo que vimos en las dos guerras del golfo,este mítico conflicto fue una prueba muy dura para todos los combatientes involucrados.Tengo entendido,por ejemplo, que los ingleses lavaban sus ropas con gasolina,ya que la tenían en grandes cantidades,mientras los alemanes debian usar la misma ropa durante un mes o más.¡Qué calamidad,mi Dios! Gracias por la atención.
"¡Ay,señor! Tú sabes lo ocupado que tendré que estar hoy.Si acaso te olvido por un instante,tu no te olvides de mi". Sir Jacob Astley antes de la batalla de Edge Hill el 23 de octubre del año de nuestro señor de 1642
TEST