Re: Alemania-URSS. Población y fuerzas armadas
Publicado: Vie Ago 25, 2017 1:24 am
Me alegra que el debate se haya puesto interesante, aunque creo que en realidad se tratan varias cuestiones a la vez.
José Luis y maxtor
Si los entiendo bien, parecen ser de la opinión de que la URSS era invencible, pues era "económicamente mucho más poderosa que la Alemania nazi" y esto es un error. En 1938, Alemania y la URSS eran economías de prácticamente el mismo tamaño y las cosas no cambiaron demasiado hasta verano de 1941, cuando la URSS perdió entre el 25% y el 30% de su PNB, eso es un hecho, como es un hecho el que Alemania contaba con un ingreso por habitante de poco más del doble que el soviético con las consecuencias que esto representa, como el que tenían un sector agrícola menos productivo, que generaba un menor excedente por trabajador y que necesitaba de una proporción mayor de su población en comparación con Alemania.
Para calcular ingresos http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/data.htm
La postura de muchos de historiadores y aficionados de que la URSS podía ganar sola, independientemente de lo que hicieran o dejar de hacer los aliados occidentales no se sostiene por ningún lado al momento de empezar a hacer números y es más producto de la propaganda soviética y ahora rusa que de otra cosa.
Citan una y otra vez las cifras de bajas de Krivosheyev, cuando incluso un aficionado como yo puede ver que hay incongruencias en su estudio, (para empezar, la cifra total de bajas fue determinada por autoridades políticas antes de que Krivosheyev empezara su estudio, tener la conclusión definida antes de comenzar un estudio no puede ser científico) que sistemáticamente tiende a minimizar las bajas soviéticas por cuestiones políticas. Han mencionado a David Glantz y con razón José Luis lo califica de "maestro", pues el mismo escribió el prefacio de un libro que califica al trabajo de Krivosheyev como de propaganda y enumera detalladamente los errores y falsedades del mismo.
Pero aún si tomamos las cifras de Krivosheyev por buenas, no salen las cuentas de como la URSS podría haber ganado sola.
Del libro de Kursk 1943 a Statistical Analysis de Niklas Zetterling y Anders Frankson páginas 6 a 7.
Historians tend to focus on the overwhelming Soviet manpower resources and their considerably greater production of weapons. To this has been added the fact that Germany had to devote resources to the Mediterranean and to defense of Western Europe even though the eastern front clearly was the main concern. The implication of this was that the larger Soviet resources made a German victory in a war of attrition impossible.
**Este es prácticamente el argumento de maxtor y José Luis.
In a war of attrition however, it is not only the ability to feed new troops, tanks, guns, and planes into the fighting that matters: the ability to inflict losses on the enemy is equally important. In this respect, the German Army had substantial superiority. as it turned out, during 1943 Germany lost 1,803,755 men on the eastern front (killed, wounded, and missing), of which 1,442,654 were combat losses. This can be compared with Soviet casualties amounting to 7,857,503 or more than four times higher, during 1943. In a war of attrition it is not possible to win if the loss ratio is too unfavorable, when the losses sustained exceed the rate of replacement. In this case the relative difference in losses was greater than the relative difference in population size. According to this calculation it was the Red Army which could be expected to run out of men first, not the German Army.
Similarly German tank and assault gun losses (on all fronts) during 1943 amounted to 8,067 while Soviet losses were approximately 23,500, which can be compared with the German production of 10,747 and the Soviet production of 24,006 tanks and assault guns. again the ratio between Soviet and German losses is greater than the ratio between Soviet and German production, in this respect it must be remembered, the Red Army was aided by the fact that it received lend and lease tanks.
The implication of these figures is that the Soviet margin of victory in the war of attrition as events actually took place was slight and it cannot be regarded as having been inevitable.
Ahora que si nos centramos en la producción de vehículos blindados.
As always, the Soviets had a choice regarding weapon system production during WWII: they could have mass produced more lower quality and less refined AFVs, or produced less more refined and higher quality AFVs. They chose the former and achieved strategic success, but payed an exceptionally high price in terms of human life. In terms of AFVs, this ‘price’ was the loss of 96 500 fully tracked AFVs compared to 32 800 German fully tracked AFVs (on the East Front) during WWII (2.94 to 1).(24) The German losses include all SP guns, SP artillery, and several thousand vehicles captured when Germany surrendered.
One very significant point about these figures is that if we remove the 11 900 AFVs received by the Soviets via Lend Lease, and allocate all German WWII fully tracked AFV production to the Wehrmacht’s East Front forces (i.e. add those lost fighting the Western Allies), then the Germans would have only needed kill loss ratio of 2.45 to 1 in order to have destroyed all Soviet fully tracked AFVs that existed on 22nd June 1941 (23 300 AFVs) and all 99 150 fully tracked AFVs produced during the war (122 450 AFVs). This figure is well below the 2.94 to 1 kill-loss ratio historically achieved. These figures demolish another more recently fashionable myth relating to the East Front; specifically that the Soviets (largely due to the huge number of T-34s produced) could have won WWII without any input from the US or Commonwealth forces. This is before we even consider the effects of increased German production (of all weapon types) due to the absence of Allied strategic bombing, the direct effects of German air superiority on the East Front from 1943 onwards, the effects of the Red Army loosing over half its motorized transport, and the effects of 9-10 000 additional (and fully supplied) heavy 88mm flak guns on the East Front from 1941 onwards.
http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/the- ... rformance/
Alemania no podía ganar una guerra de desgaste frente a la URSS a la vez que combatía contra Inglaterra y Estados Unidos, pero los soviéticos solos frente a los alemanes no veo como podían sobrevivir.
José Luis y maxtor
Si los entiendo bien, parecen ser de la opinión de que la URSS era invencible, pues era "económicamente mucho más poderosa que la Alemania nazi" y esto es un error. En 1938, Alemania y la URSS eran economías de prácticamente el mismo tamaño y las cosas no cambiaron demasiado hasta verano de 1941, cuando la URSS perdió entre el 25% y el 30% de su PNB, eso es un hecho, como es un hecho el que Alemania contaba con un ingreso por habitante de poco más del doble que el soviético con las consecuencias que esto representa, como el que tenían un sector agrícola menos productivo, que generaba un menor excedente por trabajador y que necesitaba de una proporción mayor de su población en comparación con Alemania.
Para calcular ingresos http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/data.htm
La postura de muchos de historiadores y aficionados de que la URSS podía ganar sola, independientemente de lo que hicieran o dejar de hacer los aliados occidentales no se sostiene por ningún lado al momento de empezar a hacer números y es más producto de la propaganda soviética y ahora rusa que de otra cosa.
Citan una y otra vez las cifras de bajas de Krivosheyev, cuando incluso un aficionado como yo puede ver que hay incongruencias en su estudio, (para empezar, la cifra total de bajas fue determinada por autoridades políticas antes de que Krivosheyev empezara su estudio, tener la conclusión definida antes de comenzar un estudio no puede ser científico) que sistemáticamente tiende a minimizar las bajas soviéticas por cuestiones políticas. Han mencionado a David Glantz y con razón José Luis lo califica de "maestro", pues el mismo escribió el prefacio de un libro que califica al trabajo de Krivosheyev como de propaganda y enumera detalladamente los errores y falsedades del mismo.
Pero aún si tomamos las cifras de Krivosheyev por buenas, no salen las cuentas de como la URSS podría haber ganado sola.
Del libro de Kursk 1943 a Statistical Analysis de Niklas Zetterling y Anders Frankson páginas 6 a 7.
Historians tend to focus on the overwhelming Soviet manpower resources and their considerably greater production of weapons. To this has been added the fact that Germany had to devote resources to the Mediterranean and to defense of Western Europe even though the eastern front clearly was the main concern. The implication of this was that the larger Soviet resources made a German victory in a war of attrition impossible.
**Este es prácticamente el argumento de maxtor y José Luis.
In a war of attrition however, it is not only the ability to feed new troops, tanks, guns, and planes into the fighting that matters: the ability to inflict losses on the enemy is equally important. In this respect, the German Army had substantial superiority. as it turned out, during 1943 Germany lost 1,803,755 men on the eastern front (killed, wounded, and missing), of which 1,442,654 were combat losses. This can be compared with Soviet casualties amounting to 7,857,503 or more than four times higher, during 1943. In a war of attrition it is not possible to win if the loss ratio is too unfavorable, when the losses sustained exceed the rate of replacement. In this case the relative difference in losses was greater than the relative difference in population size. According to this calculation it was the Red Army which could be expected to run out of men first, not the German Army.
Similarly German tank and assault gun losses (on all fronts) during 1943 amounted to 8,067 while Soviet losses were approximately 23,500, which can be compared with the German production of 10,747 and the Soviet production of 24,006 tanks and assault guns. again the ratio between Soviet and German losses is greater than the ratio between Soviet and German production, in this respect it must be remembered, the Red Army was aided by the fact that it received lend and lease tanks.
The implication of these figures is that the Soviet margin of victory in the war of attrition as events actually took place was slight and it cannot be regarded as having been inevitable.
Ahora que si nos centramos en la producción de vehículos blindados.
As always, the Soviets had a choice regarding weapon system production during WWII: they could have mass produced more lower quality and less refined AFVs, or produced less more refined and higher quality AFVs. They chose the former and achieved strategic success, but payed an exceptionally high price in terms of human life. In terms of AFVs, this ‘price’ was the loss of 96 500 fully tracked AFVs compared to 32 800 German fully tracked AFVs (on the East Front) during WWII (2.94 to 1).(24) The German losses include all SP guns, SP artillery, and several thousand vehicles captured when Germany surrendered.
One very significant point about these figures is that if we remove the 11 900 AFVs received by the Soviets via Lend Lease, and allocate all German WWII fully tracked AFV production to the Wehrmacht’s East Front forces (i.e. add those lost fighting the Western Allies), then the Germans would have only needed kill loss ratio of 2.45 to 1 in order to have destroyed all Soviet fully tracked AFVs that existed on 22nd June 1941 (23 300 AFVs) and all 99 150 fully tracked AFVs produced during the war (122 450 AFVs). This figure is well below the 2.94 to 1 kill-loss ratio historically achieved. These figures demolish another more recently fashionable myth relating to the East Front; specifically that the Soviets (largely due to the huge number of T-34s produced) could have won WWII without any input from the US or Commonwealth forces. This is before we even consider the effects of increased German production (of all weapon types) due to the absence of Allied strategic bombing, the direct effects of German air superiority on the East Front from 1943 onwards, the effects of the Red Army loosing over half its motorized transport, and the effects of 9-10 000 additional (and fully supplied) heavy 88mm flak guns on the East Front from 1941 onwards.
http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/the- ... rformance/
Alemania no podía ganar una guerra de desgaste frente a la URSS a la vez que combatía contra Inglaterra y Estados Unidos, pero los soviéticos solos frente a los alemanes no veo como podían sobrevivir.